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In the ground-breaking case of Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia2 
the Supreme Court of Canada recognized and affirmed Aboriginal title 
under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.3 It held that the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation possess constitutionally protected rights to certain lands 
in central British Columbia.4 In drawing this conclusion the Tsilhqot’in 
secured a declaration of “ownership rights similar to those associated with 
fee simple, including: the right to decide how the land will be used; the right 
of enjoyment and occupancy of the land; the right to possess the land; the 
right to the economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use 
and manage the land”.5 These are wide-ranging rights. Furthermore, a broad 
array of remedies exists to enforce these rights.6 Such recognition should  
                                                                                                                       
*  John Borrows, Canada Research Chair in Indigenous Law, University of Victoria Law 
School and Nexen Chair in Indigenous Leadership, Banff Centre. I would like to thank the following 
friends for their helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article: Hannah Askew, Ryan Beaton, 
Kirsty Gover, Kent McNeil, Aaron Mills, Jeremy Sapers, Jim Tully and Kerry Wilkins. 
1  Will Falk, “Aboriginal Title in Tsilhqot’in: A Radical Reading” (Vancouver Island 
Community Forest Action Network), online: <http://forestaction.wikidot.com/court>. 
2  [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in Nation”]. 
3  Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11; Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2. 
4  Tsilhqot’in narratives concerning their homelands are found in David W. Dinwoodie, 
Reserve Memories: The Power of the Past in a Chilcotin Community (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2002). 
5  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 73. 
6  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at paras. 89 and 90. The Tsilhqot’in can claim all the 
usual remedies for breaches of interest to land as long as they are adapted to their special 
relationship to land. These remedies include “injunctions, damages, and orders for the Crown to 
engage if proper consultation and accommodation of Aboriginal title”. 
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significantly enhance Tsilhqot’in stewardship and control over their 
traditional territories.7 When Aboriginal title is proven it erases the Crown’s 
assumed beneficial interest in relation to Aboriginal lands.  
At the same time the Supreme Court was careful to note that the 
declaration of Aboriginal title did not apply to “privately owned or 
underwater lands”.8 In fact, title over such lands was not asserted. 
Canadians’ sense of entitlement to these types of land likely prompted a 
narrower framing of issues.9 The stakes would have been much greater 
had Aboriginal title affected private ownership and submerged lands.10  
Nevertheless, the implications of the case are very significant. 
Tsilhqot’in title supplanted the Crown’s wrongfully asserted “beneficial 
interest” within the claim area.11 In the process this declaration changed 
non-Aboriginal peoples’ relationship with Aboriginal title lands.12 The 
Crown can no longer derive direct economic benefits from Aboriginal 
title lands. The Crown’s beneficial interest is vacated. This changes 
property law in Canada.13 One can only imagine the public’s response if 
Aboriginal title ousted private ownership within the claim area. 
If one thing seems sacrosanct in the common law it is so-called 
“private” property.14 Thus, the decision to leave private property aside in 
                                                                                                                       
7  A description of this process is found in Jonaki Bhattacharyya, Marilyn Baptiste, David 
Setah & Roger Williams, “It’s Who We Are Locating Cultural Strength in Relationship with the 
Land” in John R. Parkins, Maureen G. Reed, eds., Social Transformation in Rural Canada: 
Community, Cultures, and Collective Action (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012), at 211. 
8  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 9. 
9  A decision to frame rights narrowly and not claim third party interests was also made in 
Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney-General), [1973] S.C.J. No. 56, [1973] S.C.R. 313, at 354 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Calder”]: “ … the grants made so far in respect of Nishga lands are so 
relatively insignificant the appellants have elected to ignore them while maintaining that they were 
ultra vires”. 
10  Public reaction and political implications of Aboriginal Rights cases are discussed in 
Michael Plaxton, “The Formalist Conception of the Rule of Law and the Marshall Backlash” (2003) 
8 Review of Constitutional Studies 66. 
11  For a discussion of the Crown’s contradictory nature for Indigenous peoples in Canada 
see Mariana Valverde, “The Crown in a Multicultural Age: The Changing Epistemology of (Post) 
colonial Sovereignty ” (2012) 21(1) Social & Legal Studies 3. 
12  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 70. 
13  Tom Flanagan, “Clarity and confusion? The New Jurisprudence of Aboriginal Title”, 
April 9, 2015, online: <http://www.fraserinstitute.org/research-news/display.aspx?id=22435>. 
14  For a discussion of the cultural nature of private property and its relationship to 
Aboriginal land rights see Nicholas Blomley, “Making Space for Property” (2014) 104(6) Annals of 
the Association for American Geographers 1291; Nicholas Blomley, “The Ties that Blind: Making 
Fee Simple in the British Columbia Treaty Process” (2015) 40(2) Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers 168. I have italicized the word private when describing ownership to highlight 
the cultural assumptions made concerning this characterization. At other times I have added the 
prefacatory words “so-called” to property when describing this type of interest. For an excellent 
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seeking a declaration of title was politically astute.15 While property 
rights are not protected under Canada’s Constitution,16 land ownership is 
a primary source of wealth for most Canadians. It is also a source of 
individual pride and identity.17  
An important question which the Tsilhqot’in decision raises is 
whether “private” and Aboriginal land titles will conflict under the 
Supreme Court’s new framework.18 Will Aboriginal title oust privately 
held beneficial interests in land, or will privately owned land prevent 
declarations of Aboriginal title over such lands?  
This article’s answer to the foregoing question is: it depends. Neither 
private property nor Aboriginal title is absolute in Canadian law. Both 
deserve the utmost respect and protection — though either interest can be 
attenuated in appropriate circumstances. This article explores the 
Constitution’s potential for both protecting and attenuating so-called 
private interests in land in the face of a declaration of Aboriginal title. 
I believe the Tsilhqot’in decision contains a nascent framework for 
carefully calibrating a healthier relationship between Aboriginal title and 
private ownership. Of course, these issues will necessarily be tested in 
light of real-life (on-the-ground) facts. We also require further guidance 
from the Court to more effectively address the complexities of this 
                                                                                                                       
discussion of property from this perspective see Andries Johannes van der Walt, Property in the 
Margins (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009). 
15  The Supreme Court had not granted a declaration of Aboriginal title in the previous three 
cases: Calder, supra, note 9; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
1010 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”]; and R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] S.C.J. No. 44, 
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Marshall”]. The Supreme Court seemed to prefer a political 
solution to recognizing title. For contextual discussion of this issue see, generally, Hamar Foster, 
Heather Raven & Jeremy Webber, eds., Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the 
Future of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) and Ardith Walkem & Halie Bruce, eds., 
Box of Treasures or Empty Box? Twenty Years of Section 35 (Penticton, B.C.: Theytus Books, 2003). 
16  Property rights were deliberately excluded from the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”], see Richard Bauman, “Property Rights in the Canadian 
Constitutional Context” (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 344. For commentary see 
Philip Augustine, “Protection of the Right to Property under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms” (1986) 18 Ottawa L. Rev. 55 at 67-68; John D. Whyte, “Fundamental Justice: The Scope 
and Application of Section 7 of the Charter” (1983) 13 Manitoba L.J. 455. 
17  Land is also a source of Indigenous pride and identity. It has long nurtured Indigenous 
livelihoods, identities and worldviews. For a discussion to protect these sites see Michael Lee Ross, 
First Nations Sacred Sites in Canada’s Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006). 
18  This article will not address the question of Aboriginal title in submerged lands. For a 
discussion of this issue prior to the Tsilhqot’in decision see C. Rebecca Brown and James I. 
Reynolds, “Aboriginal Title to Sea Spaces: A Comparative Study” (2004) 37 U.B.C. L. Rev. 449. 
This issue has been addressed in the Australian context, see The Commonwealth of Australia v. 
Yarmirr and Others (2001), 208 C.L.R. 1. 
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question. Nevertheless I believe the future contours for Aboriginal title’s 
interface with “privately” owned lands will find inspiration within the 
judgment’s broader approach. This article explores ways that Aboriginal 
title might be reconciled with fee simple interests which are currently 
held under Crown grants in British Columbia. 
This article proceeds in the following way. First, I show how 
Aboriginal title and private property might conflict by providing an 
example from a post-Tsilhqot’in confrontation in Canada’s Salish Sea. 
Second, I explain how both the common law and Indigenous peoples’ 
law contain mutually obligatory practices which facilitate syncretic and 
synergistic relationships to land. Third, I discuss how federalism and 
Aboriginal rights protections can build relationships on mutually 
transformative terms under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
Fourth, I evaluate the concept of whether so-called “innocent third party 
purchasers of Aboriginal lands” can prevail in the context of Aboriginal 
title claims. Finally, I examine four obstacles which might exist in 
reconciling Aboriginal title with private ownership, and point to how 
they might be overcome.  
1. Private Ownership and Aboriginal Title: Setting the Context 
Private property’s relationship to Aboriginal title is a pressing issue. 
In the fall of 2014, a few brief months after the Tsilhqot’in decision was 
released, the relationship between Aboriginal title and private ownership 
came into public view. The site of the conflict was Shmukw’elu or Grace 
Islet.19 This is a very small island in Ganges Harbour off the shores of 
Salt Spring Island in south-western British Columbia.20 Shmukw’elu is 
part of the Gulf Islands in the Canadian waters of the Salish Sea.21  
In 1990, Barry Slawsky, an Edmonton entrepreneur, purchased fee 
simple title to the Islet and registered his interest in the land titles office. 
                                                                                                                       
19  A discussion of the broader oral histories of the Indigenous peoples in this area is found 
in Daniel P. Marshall, Those Who Fell From the Sky: A History of the Cowichan Peoples (Duncan, 
B.C.: Cowichan Tribes, 1999). 
20  For a broader Indigenous history of the region see Chris Arnett, ed., Two Houses Half 
Buried in Sand: Oral Traditions of the Hul’q’umi’num Coast Salish of Kuper Island and Vancouver 
Island by Beryl Mildred Cryer (Vancouver: Talonbooks, 2008); Chris Arnett, The Terror of the 
Coast: Land Alienation and Colonial War on Vancouver Island and the Gulf Islands, 1849-1863 
(Vancouver: Talonbooks, 1999). 
21  For a discussion of land pre-emption by settlers in the area, see Ruth W. Sandwell, 
Contesting Rural Space: Land Policy and the Practices of Resettlement on Saltspring Island,  
1859-1891 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005). 
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The site was known to be archeologically significant at the time of 
purchase. In 1966, it was registered as an Archeological Site. In 1974, it 
was further designated as a Heritage Site under the British Columbia 
Heritage Act because human remains had been found on the site. When 
Mr. Slawsky purchased the land it had been rezoned for residential 
development and he purchased the property for that purpose. In 2010, an 
archeological impact assessment identified 15 stone burial cairns on the 
Islet. In 2011, Mr. Slawsky obtained a building permit from the 
municipal authority. He took this action after securing site permits from 
the British Columbia Archeological Branch under the British Columbia 
Heritage Act. When construction began the stone cairns were to be 
preserved by encasing them in the foundation of the house for their 
“protection”.  
First Nations from the Saanich Peninsula, Cowichan Valley, and 
beyond objected to the house being built. They tried to persuade  
Mr. Slawsky to cease from constructing his house on what they regarded 
as their ancestors burial site. They also attempted to convince the 
province to intervene.  
In an August 2012 letter to Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural 
Resource Operations Steve Thomson, Penelakut Chief Earl Jack wrote: 
‘The disturbance of the dead is dangerous to the living, who may suffer 
sickness, poor fortune or death. For this reason, the dead were placed in 
cemeteries, such as burial islets, distant from village life. Only those 
persons who own the traditional ritual knowledge to deal with the dead 
may visit the cemeteries and care for the spirits through ceremonial 
practices’.22  
First Nations from the area also engaged in a public campaign to 
pressure the province to purchase the land. This activity garnered 
significant support throughout southern British Columbia and led to a 
series of First Nations blockades, stop-work orders and other activities 
designed to halt construction.23 However, despite public support, First 
Nations and other protestors were initially unsuccessful in persuading the 
owner or the province to stop construction. It was not until the 
                                                                                                                       
22  Katherine Gordon Palmer, “Uncharted Territory”, FOCUS online, Victoria’s Magazine of 
People, Ideas and Culture, January 2015, online: <http://focusonline.ca/?q=node/819> [hereinafter 
“Palmer”]. 
23  For a broader contextualization of blockades in Canada see Yale D. Belanger &  
P. Whitney Lackenbauer, eds., Blockades or Breakthroughs? Aboriginal Peoples Confront the 
Canadian State (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2015). 
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Tsilhqot’in decision was released that First Nations gained the leverage 
necessary to bring additional pressure to bear on the province.  
On November 10, 2014, Chief William Seymour of the Cowichan 
Tribes wrote the Premier of British Columbia and Mr. Slawsky. On 
behalf of his Nation he claimed Aboriginal title to the so-called privately 
owned land. Chief Seymour stated: 
The construction on Grace Islet for residential purposes is unacceptable 
to the Cowichan Tribes. Cowichan Tribes has not and does not consent 
to it. We understand that Minister Thomson was proceeding to the 
provincial treasury board for monies necessary to repurchase the fee 
simple title granted by British Columbia in the lands of Grace Islet. We 
have not heard of any progress in this regard over the last three months. 
If the province fails to solve the Grace Islet dispute promptly, through 
repurchase of the fee simple interest from Mr. Slawsky, then Cowichan 
Tribes is prepared to proceed with legal action as outlined in the 
attached draft statement of claim.24 
With this letter, the stage was fully set for Aboriginal title’s conflict 
with Mr. Slawsky’s fee simple title, on the site regarded by the Cowichan 
Nation as containing unextinguished Aboriginal title land. Cowichan 
Nation lawyers drafted a statement of claim which accompanied Chief 
Seymour’s letter. They sought a declaration that:  
(a) the descendants of the Cowichan Nation, including the Cowichan 
Tribes, have Aboriginal title to Grace Islet by virtue of section 35(1) 
of the Constitution Act, 1982; 
(b) the Crown grant in fee simple interest in Grace Islet unjustifiably 
infringes Cowichan Aboriginal Title to these lands; 
(c) the Crown Grant of fee simple interest is invalid; 
(d) the descendants of the Cowichan Nation, including the Cowichan 
Tribes, are entitled, as against British Columbia, to the lands of 
Grace Islet.25 
These allegations illustrate that Aboriginal title and private 
ownership interests were on a collision course. While Chief Seymour 
                                                                                                                       
24  November 10, 2014, from Chief William Seymour of the Cowichan Tribes (on file with author). 
25  NOTICE OF CIVIL CLAIM, David Robbins, LL.P., Woodward and Company, In the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, BETWEEN Cowichan Tribes and Squtxulenuhw, also known 
as William C. Seymour Sr., on their own behalf, and on behalf of all other descendants of the 
Cowichan Nation PLAINTIFFS AND her Majesty the Queen in right of the Province of British 
Columbia and Barry Norman Slawsky DEFENDENTS (on file with author). 
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was quick to point out that the First Nation was not claiming private 
lands more generally in the area,26 saying that this situation was 
“completely exceptional”,27 the matter nevertheless raised fears 
throughout the region that other people’s private lands were at risk.28  
By way of contrast Mr. Slawsky presented his own views in a local 
newspaper, the Victoria Times Colonist, in the following way: 
I am the owner of Grace Islet in Ganges Harbour at Saltspring Island. I 
purchased the property in 1990 because I thought it was a beautiful 
location. Since then, I have worked through a complex group of 
governmental regulations in order to receive approval to build my 
retirement home here. 
Throughout this comprehensive process, I have been guided by 
professional environmental and archeological consultants in my 
determination to be respectful of First Nations. The provincial Archaeology 
Branch carried out extensive consultation efforts with First Nations, as 
recently explained by Lands and Forests Minister Steve Thomson in the 
Times Colonist. My site-alteration permit from the province includes 
numerous conditions that respect First Nations concerns. 
After 24 years of ownership of this property, some vocal critics claim I 
am building a home in a known First Nations cemetery. Nothing could 
be further from the truth.  
..... 
With the exception of three bone fragments, two found in 2006 and one 
found in 2007, nearly a decade ago, there has been no finding at any 
time of any trace of human remains anywhere on Grace Islet.  
Neither of these two findings in 2006 and 2007 is anywhere near the 
location of my home.  
..... 
                                                                                                                       
26  In response to a question about whether private property would be claimed throughout 
their traditional territory Chief Seymour said he: “doesn’t agree that the Grace Islet case will set a 
precedent of that nature. ‘I hope it doesn’t do that. It shouldn’t. First Nations have never been after 
private land.’ Cowichan haven’t asked for private property to be expropriated as part of their treaty 
negotiations”, Palmer, supra, note 22. 
27  Chief Seymour said that going to court was a strategy of last resort. He said: “I really 
hope we don’t have to go to court.” He says the First Nation has had little choice but to take this 
dramatic step: “We’ve been forced to this point.” Palmer, supra, note 22. 
28  The lawyer for Mr. Slawsky said: “This is going to ignite a firestorm of controversy if 
now private land is no longer something you can buy with any certainty”, Palmer, supra, note 22. 
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I am confident that, over time, people of goodwill will see past the 
rhetoric and consider the facts for themselves.29  
The Penelakut, Halalt, Tsartlip, Tseycum and Tsawwassen First 
Nations also declared interests in the site, in addition to the Cowichan 
Nation.30 Each claimed Grace Islet as an ancestral burial site.31 These 
claims are a by-product of centuries-long interlocking relationships 
where First Nations members married across community and national 
lines.32 While Cowichan threatened the province with the suit, Chief 
Seymour also recognized neighbouring Nations would also have claims 
to the site.33 He said: “For Cowichan to claim totally exclusive use 
wouldn’t be right. Our neighbours used Grace Islet too. We will 
definitely talk to them and deal with that aspect if we go to court.”34 This 
approach is consistent with the Tsilhqot’in decision which recognized 
that Aboriginal groups could possess shared exclusivity in land.35 The 
Court has also been clear that Aboriginal groups can have exclusive 
occupation in land even though other groups are entitled to share.36  
                                                                                                                       
29  Barry N. Slawsky, Victoria Times Colonist, August 6, 2014, online: <http://www.timescolonist. 
com/opinion/op-ed/comment-owner-gives-his-side-on-grace-islet-issue-1.1296716>. 
30  A broader historical overview of First Nations in this area is found in Homer Barnett, The 
Coast Salish of British Columbia (Eugene: University of Oregon Press, 1955). 
31  Coast Salish burial practices are discussed in Brian Thom, The Dead and the Living: Burial 
Mounds and Cairns and the Development of Social Classes in the Gulf of Georgia Region (Master’s thesis, 
University of British Columbia, 1995) (on file with author). 
32  For a discussion of broader relationships to land in the area see Brian David Thom, Coast 
Salish Senses of Place: Dwelling, Meaning, Power, Property, and Territory in the Coast Salish 
World (Ph.D. Dissertation, McGill University, 2005); Wayne Suttles, Coast Salish Essays 
(Vancouver: Talon Books, 1987), at 209-32. 
33  In addition to Aboriginal title claims, the treaty right of First Nations on the Saanich 
Peninsula may also be relevant to Grace Islet. Douglas Treaties contains the clause: 
… our village sites and enclosed fields are to be kept for our own use, for the use of 
our children, and for those who may follow after us and the land shall be properly 
surveyed hereafter. It is understood, however, that the land itself, with these small 
exceptions, becomes the entire property of the white people for ever; it is also 
understood that we are at liberty to hunt over the unoccupied lands, and to carry on 
our fisheries as formerly. 
In addition, the Tsawwassen have a treaty with Canada and the British Columbia 
government which was implemented in April 2009. A map (which is an official part of the 
Tsawwassen Treaty) shows Grace Islet as being surrendered by the Tsawwassen First Nation 
to Canada. 
34  Palmer, supra, note 22. 
35  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at paras. 48-49; Marshall, supra, note 15, at para. 57. 
See also United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941). 
36  Delgamuukw, supra, note 15, at para. 157: “ … aboriginal laws under which permission 
may be granted to other aboriginal groups to use or reside even temporarily on land would reinforce 
the finding of exclusive occupation. Indeed, if that permission were the subject of treaties between 
the aboriginal nations in question, those treaties would also form part of the aboriginal perspective.” 
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The Chief’s position also illustrates the Delgamuukw principle that 
exclusive occupation can be shared between First Nations as 
“recognized by either de facto practice or by the aboriginal system of 
governance”.37 The Chief’s declaration is also consistent with 
Hul’qumi’num law.38  
In February of 2015, in response to these developments, the 
provincial government purchased Grace Islet from Mr. Slawsky. The 
acquisition seemingly occurred at the request of the Cowichan Nation. 
This action was also presumably taken to avoid potentially precedent-
setting litigation that favourably pitted Aboriginal title against “private” 
ownership. The purchase price for Grace Islet was $5.45 million, which 
consisted of $850,000 for the land and $4.6 million as a settlement for 
additional costs and losses incurred by Mr. Slawsky.39 While both the 
private owner and the First Nation suffered losses in this case, the First 
Nations were not compensated for their loss. Nevertheless, at the time of 
purchase the land was turned over to the Nature Conservancy of Canada 
to preserve the natural environment and protect the burial site.40 To 
commemorate this action, and express their relief about the Islet’s 
protection, celebrations and ceremonies were held by Elders and 
members of the Tseycum, Tsawout, Tsartlip, Cowichan, Pauquachin, 
Lyackson, Stz’uminus, Penelakut and Halalt First Nations.41 
This example illustrates that private ownership and Aboriginal title 
do not necessarily occupy two unrelated legal worlds. Overlapping 
claims can occur: not just among Aboriginal peoples’ claims, but 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. There will be instances 
where Indigenous peoples feel that they cannot, in good conscience,  
 
                                                                                                                       
See also Marshall, supra, note 15, at para. 55 and Kent McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation and Joint 
Aboriginal Title” (February 2015) (on file with author). 
37  Delgamuukw, supra, note 15, at paras. 158-159. 
38  Sarah Morales, Snuw’uyulh: Fostering an Understanding of the Hul’qumi’num Legal 
Tradition (Victoria: Ph.D. Law, 2014), at 256-85. 
39  Wendy Stueck, “British Columbia pays $5.45-million for Grace Islet”, The Globe and 
Mail, February 16, 2015. The $4.6 million amount included “costs incurred over the past two 
decades by the landowner and his lost opportunity for future enjoyment of the property”, the 
province said in a statement Monday. Costs also reflect the expense of putting in utilities and 
materials for a “high-end house”. 
40  For information concerning Nature Conservancy of Canada ownership, see “A Graceful 
Resolution: NCC joins forces with the BC Government and First Nations to Protect Grace Islet”, 
online: <http://www.natureconservancy.ca/en/where-we-work/british-columbia/stories/a-graceful-
resolution.html>. 
41  British Columbia News Release, “Ceremony Celebrates Grace Islet Partnership”, March 17, 
2015, online: <http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2013-2017/2015FLNR0035-000350.htm.>. 
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avoid claiming Aboriginal title over land which is purportedly subject to 
fee simple. While it is obvious that burial and other sacred sites are one 
place where such interests may intersect, it is possible that other types of 
land may be subject to simultaneous “Aboriginal” and “private” claims. 
While First Nations were very clear throughout the Grace Islet dispute 
that they had no interest in disturbing private ownership, it is possible to 
envision other scenarios where First Nations will claim Aboriginal title 
over “private” lands. Since Aboriginal title includes rights to use the land 
for a wide variety of purposes,42 there may be occasions where First 
Nations attempt to subordinate private ownership to advance their own 
constitutionally recognized economic, social or political interests in such 
lands.43  
Given the high stakes involved, the Constitution’s potential for 
protecting and/or attenuating private interests in land in the face of 
Aboriginal title is real  and complex. The province cannot buy land and 
put it into protected status every time a conflict arises with Aboriginal title, 
as occurred with Grace Islet. This would be too expensive. An ad hoc 
approach would also be economically disruptive given the uncertainty this 
would generate in real estate and other markets. A series of one-off solutions 
would also be politically dangerous. Frustration and anger would mount if 
Indigenous and other people saw their lands under constant legal siege. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court’s doctrinal framework must be canvassed to 
determine whether Tsilhqot’in and other Aboriginal rights decisions provide 
guidance in addressing this pressing issue.44 I believe guidance is available 
to address these conflicts in ways which avoid stereotyping both Indigenous 
peoples land rights, and the nature of private ownership in land. 
                                                                                                                       
42  For discussion of Tsilhqot’in resource rights after the Tsilhqot’in case, see Nigel Bankes, 
“The implications of the Tsilhqot'in (William) and Grassy Narrows (Keewatin) Decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Canada for the Natural Resources Industries” (2015) Journal of Energy and 
Natural Resources Law. 
43  “Gitxsan First Nation Evicting Rail, Logging, Sport Fishing Interests”, July 10, 2014, 
CBC News, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/gitxsan-first-nation-evicting-
rail-logging-sport-fishing-interests-1.2703664> [hereinafter “CBC News”]. 
44  There are claims to Aboriginal title in other parts of Canada, where First Nations claim 
that they either did not enter into treaties with the Crown or that their treaties did not extinguish 
Aboriginal title. This issue was raised in Marshall, supra, note 15, at para. 84: “The Crown argued 
that even if common law aboriginal title is established, it was extinguished by statutes passed 
between 1774 and 1862 relating to forestry on Crown lands. Since aboriginal title is not established, 
it is unnecessary to consider this issue.” 
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2. Abandoning Absolutes in the Common Law, Constitutional Law 
and Indigenous Law 
No one has absolute interests in land in Canada. Law mediates these 
competing and complementary claims to protect individuals and advance 
the public interest. Thus while a fee simple interest is the common law’s 
“largest known estate in land”,45 it is not an unqualified interest.46 
Privately owned land can be subject to mortgages, leases, liens, 
easements, zoning regulations, expropriation orders, taxation, treaty 
rights, contractual obligations and other statutory, common law and 
equitable limitations.47 Crown ownership can also be restricted by private 
interests carved out from the Crown’s beneficial interest.48 Constraints 
on ownership for Aboriginal peoples also exist when dealing with 
Aboriginal title.49 Aboriginal title rights are subject to inherent limits.50 
In the Tsilhqot’in case the Supreme Court wrote that “rights that are 
recognized and affirmed are not absolute”.51 These limitations also 
advance broader public interests.52 Thus, all landholders in Canada 
(Aboriginal, Crown, third-party) have less than an absolute interest in 
their lands for our mutual health and benefit.  
As in the Grace Islet case, Indigenous peoples’ own laws do not 
often frame relationships in absolute terms.53 This is particularly the case 
                                                                                                                       
45  Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, S.B.C. 1999, c. 2, s. 3. 
46  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press ed., 1979), Vol. 2, at 411. 
47  See generally, Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 6th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2014). 
48  Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), at 40-41. 
49  Despite rejecting the idea that land in Canada was terra nullius upon European arrival, 
the Supreme Court nevertheless accepts the proposition that the Crown has underlying, radical, or 
allodial title to land in Canada: Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 69. If the land was not 
vacant when Europeans arrived, and Indigenous peoples never gave underlying title to the Crown, it 
is hard to accept the proposition that the Court has rejected the idea of terra nullius in Canadian law. 
It seems as though the Crown has underlying title through assumptions that it was the Crown’s to 
claim because there was some type of vacuum underlying Indigenous occupation of lands. For a 
discussion of this point see John Borrows, “The Durability of Terra Nullius” (2015) U.B.C. L. Rev. 
See also John Borrows, “Aboriginal Title in Tsilhqot’in v. British Columbia [2014] SCC 44”, 
August 2014 Māori L. Rev., online: <http://maorilawreview.co.nz/2014/08/aboriginal-title-in-
tsilhqotin-v-british-columbia-2014-scc-44/>. 
50  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 74. 
51  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 119. 
52  R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1113 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Sparrow”]; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] S.C.J. No. 79, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, at paras. 74-75 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Gladstone”]. 
53  However, there are instances where First Nations have claimed rights to evict private 
interests in land; see CBC News, supra, note 43. 
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when relating to land.54 Constraints on ownership often flow from 
principles of balance, reciprocity and respect within these legal 
traditions.55 We saw this in how Chief Seymour presented his peoples’ 
case. Sharing is a prominent principle within Indigenous law.56 Thus, 
perhaps even more than the common law, there is significant room for 
variegated property interests within a First Nations legal context. While 
Aboriginal title may be vested in a broader collective, sharing is 
facilitated within these communities through governance structures 
which encourage reciprocity and mutual aid.57 Thus, rights to use and 
occupy and benefit from land may reside in a particular clan, house 
group, family or individual.58 Indigenous law can also recognize and 
affirm many interests, including “private” interests.59 The fact that 
                                                                                                                       
54  In fact, I recently heard Chief Roger William of the Tsilhqot’in Nation state that 
Tsilhqot’in law recognizes private ownership interests within their territory. Chief Roger William 
said private ownership is a strongly protected interest under Tsilhqot’in law. He noted that the 
Tsilhqot’in people do not want to dispossess people who live on their traditional territory and claim 
ownership from a Crown source. They want to convert the source of this ownership from a Crown to 
an Aboriginal grant and thus desire to see this land have a stronger foundation. In fact, he said the 
Tsilhqot’in people want to treat these people better than the Crown did when it purported to hold the 
beneficial interest in Tsilhqot’in land. Chief William said his people understand that private 
ownership from a Crown source in British Columbia flows from a flawed original grant. The 
Tsilhqot’in people want to give non-native owners of their land even greater protection under the 
Tsilhqot’in legal system. Chief Roger William, Canadian Bar Association, Aboriginal Lawyers 
Forum, May 2, 2015, Tulalip Reservation, Washington State. 
55  For examples of Indigenous constitutional legal principles which promote balance, 
reciprocity and respect, see generally Nipissing, Gichi-Naaknigewin, August 2013, online: 
<http://www.bobgoulais.com/wp-content/uploads/nfn_constitution_final_august_8_20131.pdf>; The 
Constitution of the Nisga’a Nation, October 1998, Preamble and Section 2, online: 
<http://www.nisgaanation.ca/sites/default/files/legislation/Constitution%20of%20the%20Nisga%27
a%20Nation%20-%201998-10-01.pdf>; Nunatsiavut Constitution Act, December 2005, online: 
<http://www.nunatsiavut.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/IL%202005-02%20-%20E.pdf>. 
56  Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Sharing the Harvest: The Road to Self-
Reliance, Report of the National Round Table on Aboriginal Economic Development and Resources 
(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1993). 
57  For a discussion of governance relationships with Aboriginal title, see Jeremy Webber, 
“The Public-Law Dimension of Indigenous Property Rights” in Nigel Bankes and Timo Koivurova, 
eds., The Proposed Nordic Saami Convention: National and International Dimensions of Indigenous 
Property Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2013), at 79-102. 
58  Kenneth H. Bobroff, “Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of 
Common Ownership” (2001) 54 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1559 [hereinafter “Bobroff”]; Val Napoleon, 
“Living Together: Gitksan Legal Reasoning as a Foundation for Consent” in Jeremy Webber and 
Colin M. Macleod, eds., Between Consenting Peoples: Political Community and the Meaning of 
Consent (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), at 45; Justin B. Richland, Arguing with Tradition: The 
Language of Law in Hopi Tribal Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Chilkat Indian 
Village, IRA v. Johnson (November 3, 1993) 20 Indian Law Reporter 6727, No. 90-01 (Chilkat 
Indian Village Tribal Court). 
59  An example of so-called private interests being protected by Indigenous law is often 
hidden in plain sight. Their force does not solely rely on Canadian law compelling the Crown and 
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Aboriginal title is held on a collective basis often obscures more 
particularized land rights which exist within First Nations.60 As is the 
case in the common law, these interests also aim to protect individuals 
and enhance reciprocal obligations for people’s mutual benefit.61 
Furthermore, constitutional jurisprudence facilitates and limits the rights 
and interests of all Canadians.62 It does this through doctrines related to 
reconciliation, fundamental justice, reasonableness and proportionality.63 
This is a more general feature of Canada’s Constitutional tradition and it is 
also present when dealing with Indigenous peoples. In R. v. Oakes, the 
Supreme Court of Canada described key constitutional values which may at 
times justify limitations on our rights: “respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation 
of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity and faith 
in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of 
individuals and groups in society.”64 In an Aboriginal rights context, some of 
these limitations also flow from the fact that Canadian constitutional law 
springs from Indigenous and common law sources.65 These principles, in 
                                                                                                                       
Indigenous peoples to abide by these agreements. Treaties made with Indigenous peoples are made 
through Indigenous representatives drawing on the authority of their laws. Thus, when treaties are 
signed in good faith, Indigenous law works to protect subsequent Crown interests created from lands 
agreed to be shared through these agreements. For a fuller discussion of the role of Indigenous law in 
treaty-making, interpretation and implementation see Harold Cardinal and Walter Hildebrandt, 
Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream is That Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly 
Recognized as Nations (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2000). 
60  Bobroff, supra, note 58, see particularly 1571-1600. 
61  Perhaps this is why the Supreme Court has held that Aboriginal title is subject to an 
“inherent limit” in any land use practice in order to respect the “ongoing nature of the group’s 
attachment” to their territories through time. Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 67; 
Delgamuukw, supra, note 15, at para. 116. 
62  For a range of opinions on this issue see Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller, Gregiore 
Webber, eds., Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
63  Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Professor Moshe Cohen-Eliya, Dr. Iddo Porat, Proportionality 
and Constitutional Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); David Beatty, The 
Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
64  R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 136 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
65  Ultimately, all land law in Canada partially flows from Aboriginal title; either through its 
extinguishment or modification to allow for the creation of private ownership interests, or through its 
continued existence which accommodates private ownership interests. Since Aboriginal peoples 
owned all the land in what is now Canada prior to Canadian law’s creation, Aboriginal ownership 
rights are sustained under the doctrine of continuity until they are clearly and plainly extinguished 
(before 1982), or modified (after 1982) through modern treaties or justifiable infringements. The 
Court has been very clear that accommodation of Aboriginal rights and Crown interests is necessary 
where Aboriginal rights have not been extinguished: Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of 
Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida Nation”]. 
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addition to those articulated in the Oakes test, should also guide the 
relationship between Aboriginal title and private ownership.  
Since Aboriginal rights are formed through inter-societal law they 
are mutually modified by both Indigenous and common law 
perspectives.66 This means that both Aboriginal title and non-Aboriginal 
property interests are limited by the other’s legal perspectives within 
Canadian law. For example, by ruling that Aboriginal title is not 
absolute, the Court ensured that the Crown was not completely stripped 
of future opportunities to share the land’s benefits, even though it 
vacated the province’s wrongfully asserted beneficial interest.67 Thus the 
Crown has the ability to limit (though not extinguish) Aboriginal land 
rights  despite not holding beneficial interests in Aboriginal title lands. 
As noted, limitations on Aboriginal land rights also flow from 
section 35(1)’s “framework” which exists “to facilitate negotiations and 
reconciliation of Aboriginal interests with those of the broader public”.68 
In making this statement the Court is clear that Aboriginal title exists “in 
relationship” with other legal interests in Canada more generally. The 
Grace Islet scenario demonstrated how negotiation can work to 
tentatively reconcile the rights and duties of government to First Nations 
and other citizens. This view of section 35(1) illustrates that whenever 
Aboriginal “rights” are affirmed corresponding “duties” attach to 
government action, including those involving its allocation and use of 
land. As former Yale Law Professor W.N. Hohfeld wrote, “[A] duty is 
the invariable correlative of that legal relation which is most properly 
called a right or claim.”69 “Duty” and “right” are correlative terms. 
                                                                                                                       
66  Thus Canadian law must recognize property and other land rights limitations which flow 
from Indigenous law and its interaction with broader Canadian law. The Supreme Court of Canada 
has observed that Aboriginal rights are sui generis, meaning they are unique and of their own kind. 
As such they incorporate and bridge Indigenous law and common law perspectives, see John 
Borrows and Len Rotman, “The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does it Make a 
Difference” (1997) 36 Alberta L. Rev. 9. Since a “morally and politically defensible conception of 
aboriginal rights will incorporate both legal perspectives”, R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, 
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at para. 42 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Van der Peet”]. Aboriginal title must itself be 
responsive to the liberties and limits found within these legal systems. 
67  Despite its positive effects, this holding is nevertheless problematic from a First Nation’s 
perspective because it upholds the Crown’s troubling acquisition of underlying title to their land by 
accepting the doctrine of terra nullius (despite assertions to the contrary). See John Borrows, 
“Canada’s Colonial Constitution” in Michael Coyle and John Borrows, The Right(s) Relationship: 
Treaties and Canadian Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, under consideration). 
68  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 118. 
69  Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, Walter Wheeler Cook, ed. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1919) at 35-64. 
I have made these same points in John Borrows, “Let Obligations Be Done” in Hamar Foster, 
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Whenever “a right is invaded, a duty is violated”.70 Third parties such as 
private owners may have direct obligations to Aboriginal peoples related 
to the avoidance of nuisance and trespass.71 While third parties are not 
ultimately responsible for consulting and accommodating Aboriginal 
peoples when Aboriginal rights may be infringed,72 they are nevertheless 
directly affected by the provincial Crown’s obligations to Aboriginal 
peoples.73 In this sense Aboriginal title affirmatively exists in 
relationship to other interests besides those of the Crown in Canada.74 
The Court’s framework should thus cause us to see section 35(1)’s 
reciprocal protections and limitations. In the first instance, Crown’s 
claims are limited by Aboriginal title. For example, Crown “incursions 
on Aboriginal title cannot be justified if they would substantially deprive 
future generations of the benefit of the land”.75 At the same time 
Aboriginal title is limited by Crown action whenever it can establish 
justifiable reasons for infringing that title. For such limitations to “justify 
overriding the Aboriginal title-holding group’s wishes on the basis of the 
broader public good, the government must show: (1) that it discharged its 
procedural duty to consult and accommodate, (2) that its actions were 
backed by a compelling and substantial objective; and (3) that the 
governmental action is consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary obligation 
to the group”.76  
                                                                                                                       
Heather Raven & Jeremy Webber, eds., Let Right be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and 
the Future of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), at 201. 
70  Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Kurtz (1894), 10 Ind. App. 60, 37 N.E. 303, at 304. 
71  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 90: “The usual remedies that lie for breach of 
interests in land are available, adapted as may be necessary to reflect the special nature of Aboriginal 
title and the fiduciary obligation owed by the Crown to the holders of Aboriginal title.” 
72  The Court has limited the “obligation on third parties to consult or accommodate” claims 
as they relate to Aboriginal rights because “[t]he Crown alone remains legally responsible for the 
consequences of its actions and interactions with third parties, that affect Aboriginal interests.” 
Haida Nation, supra, note 65, at para. 53. 
73  In Sparrow, the Indian fishery was “given priority over the interests of other user 
groups”: Sparrow, supra, note 52, at para. 81. Gladstone, supra, note 52, at para. 62: “The doctrine 
of priority requires that the government demonstrate that, in allocating the resource, it has taken 
account of the existence of aboriginal rights and allocated the resource in a manner respectful of the 
fact that those rights have priority over the exploitation of the fishery by other users.” Delgamuukw, 
supra, note 15, at para. 167: “The exclusive nature of aboriginal title is relevant to the degree of 
scrutiny of the infringing measure or action. For example, if the Crown’s fiduciary duty requires that 
aboriginal title be given priority, then it is the altered approach to priority that I laid down in 
Gladstone which should apply.” 
74  For a comparative view on the relationship of Aboriginal title lands to other interests see 
Kent McNeil, “Co-Existence of Indigenous Rights and Other Interests in Land in Australia and 
Canada” (1997) 3 Canadian Native Law Reporter 1-18. 
75  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 86. 
76  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 77. 
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The presence of mutually constraining protections and limitations 
(for both the Crown and Aboriginal peoples) demonstrates that neither 
party can make absolute claims to land in British Columbia when 
Aboriginal title is recognized by the courts.77 In the cause of 
strengthening both parties, each party can limit the other party’s interests, 
though in varied degrees in different circumstances. Reconciliation is the 
overriding goal of Aboriginal rights jurisprudence.78 This objective exists 
to protect both individual and the broader public interest, which includes 
the Aboriginal public too.79 
3. Limiting Absolutes: Section 35(1) and Section 92(13) 
For most of Canada’s history, almost without exception, the 
Aboriginal public interest in land has not been effectively protected.80 
Aboriginal peoples have been (and at present are actively being) unjustly 
deprived of their lands and resources with tragic consequences.81 In 
colloquial terms, their land has and is being stolen and they are greatly 
suffering as a result of this loss.82 Concomitantly, non-Aboriginal land 
owners have secured vast quantities of land at the expense of Aboriginal 
peoples.83 In much of British Columbia Aboriginal title was given to 
                                                                                                                       
77  It should be noted that the land right which constitutes Aboriginal title exists within 
Indigenous peoples’ own legal systems without regard to Canadian Court recognition. What the 
Canadian law labels as Aboriginal title is an Indigenous land interest recognized within Indigenous 
legal systems long before contact, even if it has only been recognized by the Canadian state recently. 
78  Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 69, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550, at para. 32 (S.C.C.); Mikisew Cree First Nation v. 
Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J. No. 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388, at para. 1 
(S.C.C.); Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14, 
[2013] 1 S.C.R. 623, 2013 SCC 14, at paras. 66-67 (S.C.C.). 
79  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at paras. 81 and 82: “ … the compelling and substantial 
objective of the government must be considered from the Aboriginal perspective as well as from the 
perspective of the broader public. … To constitute a compelling and substantial objective, the 
broader public goal asserted by the government must further the goal of reconciliation, having regard 
to both the Aboriginal interest and the broader public objective.” 
80  Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1996), Vol. 2, Part II, Chapter 4, online: 
<http://caid.ca/RRCAP2.4.pdf>. 
81  Tom Flanagan, Christopher Alcantara & Andre Le Dressay, Beyond the Indian Act: 
Restoring Aboriginal Property Rights (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012). 
82  A guide for researching this issue is found at Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, 
Stolen Lands, Broken Promises: Researching the Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 2d ed. 
(Vancouver: Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, 2005), online: <http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx. 
cloudfront.net/ubcic/legacy_url/560/Stolen_20Lands__20Broken_20Promises.pdf?1426350430>. 
83  Sparrow, supra, note 52, at 1103: “And there can be no doubt that over the years the 
rights of the Indians were often honoured in the breach (for one instance in a recent case in this 
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third parties without any transfer, sale or surrender.84 Indigenous land 
rights were unilaterally pre-empted by settlers throughout most of British 
Columbia history without any input from Aboriginal peoples.85 This 
process continues today.86 The same statute that granted the right of pre-
emption to settlers denied the same to Aboriginal peoples.87 Now, with 
each judicial recognition of Aboriginal title,88 Aboriginal land-holdings 
might expand and be more adequately protected. As a result non-
Aboriginal property interests may from time-to-time diminish in favour 
of Aboriginal peoples.  
This is a consequence of Aboriginal rights being constitutionally 
protected  and privately owned lands not enjoying this same 
heightened status.89 While it is true that section 92(13) gives the 
provinces jurisdiction over “property and civil rights”, this grant of  
 
                                                                                                                       
Court, see Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654). As MacDonald J. stated in Pasco v. 
Canadian National Railway Co., [1986] 1 C.N.L.R. 35, at 37 (B.C.S.C.): “We cannot recount with 
much pride the treatment accorded to the native people of this country.” 
84  See generally Hamar Foster, “Letting Go the Bone: The Idea of Indian Title in British 
Columbia 1849-1927” in Hamar Foster & John McLaren, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian 
Law: Volume VI: The Legal History of British Columbia and the Yukon (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1995), at 28; Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics in British Columbia: The 
Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990), at 289. 
85  For a discussion of the unilateral dispossession of Aboriginal peoples in British 
Columbia, see generally Jean Barman, The West Beyond the West: A History of British Columbia 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); Cole Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism 
Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002). 
86  Land is regularly alienated to non-Aboriginal people in British Columbia despite never 
having been sold, transferred or surrendered by Aboriginal people. For one prominent example of 
this process, see Adams Lake Indian Band v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests, Lands and 
Natural Resource Operations), [2013] B.C.J. No. 1026, 50 B.C.L.R. (5th) 86, 2013 BCSC 877 
(B.C.S.C.); Adams Lake Indian Band v. British Columbia (Lieutenant Governor in Council), [2012] 
B.C.J. No. 1661, 35 B.C.L.R. (5th) 253, 2012 BCCA 333 (B.C.C.A.); Adams Lake Indian Band v. 
British Columbia (Lieutenant Governor in Council), [2011] B.C.J. No. 1519, 21 B.C.L.R. (5th) 286, 
2011 BCCA 339 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Manuel, [2008] B.C.J. No. 557, 293 D.L.R. (4th) 713, 231 C.C.C. 
(3d) 468 (B.C.C.A.). 
87  Robin Fisher, Contact and Conflict: Indian-European relations in British Columbia, 
1774-1890 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), at 171. 
88  I must re-emphasize at this point that in my view, the right to land the Court has 
recognized as Aboriginal title exists within Indigenous legal systems before and regardless of state 
recognition. Aboriginal title can refer to the pre-existing rights to land held by Indigenous peoples 
under their own legal systems. On the other hand, it can refer to the often-unsatisfactory way that 
these rights have been interpreted and affirmed by the courts by blending the common law and 
Indigenous legal traditions. 
89  When the Constitution was patriated property rights were considered but a decision was 
taken to not enumerate them in Canada’s Constitution Act 1982, see Clare F. Beckton, “The Impact 
on Women of Entrenchment of Property Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”  
9 Dalhousie L.J. (1985) 288. 
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power cannot be exercised in a way which transgresses Aboriginal rights 
unless the province justifies such acts within section 35(1)’s 
framework.90 Furthermore, section 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867 also 
limits provincial interests when Aboriginal title is found to exist.91 For 
example, the province does not have the power to extinguish Aboriginal 
title through a private grant.92 The Crown’s interests in lands are subject 
to Aboriginal rights and the Crown cannot profit from this future, 
contingent interest without first dealing with Aboriginal title.93 As the 
                                                                                                                       
90  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 103: 
Provincial power to regulate land held under Aboriginal title is constitutionally limited in 
two ways. First, it is limited by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 35 requires 
any abridgment of the rights flowing from Aboriginal title to be backed by a compelling 
and substantial governmental objective and to be consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary 
relationship with title holders. Second, a province’s power to regulate lands under 
Aboriginal title may in some situations also be limited by the federal power over 
“Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” under s. 91(24) of the Constitution  
Act, 1867. 
91  Section 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, on its face, subordinates a province’s 
beneficial interest in particular land within the province to such pre-existing rights or interests as 
pertain to that same land. Kent McNeil has argued that when land is subject to Aboriginal title, a 
province cannot grant that land to third parties free of the Aboriginal title (i.e., that the third party’s 
interest is subject to the pre-existing Aboriginal interest): see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Rights, 
Resource Development, and the Source of the Provincial Duty to Consult in Haida Nation and Taku 
River” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 447, at 448-49. 
92  In Delgamuukw, supra, note 15, para. 175, the Supreme Court held that provincial grants 
of fee simple interests to third parties cannot and do not extinguish Aboriginal title: 
The province responds by pointing to the fact that underlying title to lands held 
pursuant to aboriginal title vested with the provincial Crown pursuant to s. 109 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. In its submission, this right of ownership carried with it the 
right to grant fee simples which, by implication, extinguish aboriginal title, and so by 
negative implication excludes aboriginal title from the scope of s. 91(24) . The 
difficulty with the province’s submission is that it fails to take account of the language 
of s. 109 , which states in part that: 
109. All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the several Provinces 
of Canada . . . at the Union . . . shall belong to the several Provinces . . . subject to 
any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest other than that of the 
Province in the same. 
Although that provision vests underlying title in provincial Crowns, it qualifies provincial 
ownership by making it subject to the “any Interest other than that of the Province in the same”. In 
St. Catherine’s Milling, the Privy Council held that Aboriginal title was such an interest, and rejected 
the argument that provincial ownership operated as a limit on federal jurisdiction. … Thus, although 
on surrender of Aboriginal title the province would take absolute title, jurisdiction to accept 
surrenders lies with the federal government. The same can be said of extinguishment — although on 
extinguishment of Aboriginal title, the province would take complete title to the land, the jurisdiction 
to extinguish lies with the federal government. 
93  Haida Nation, supra, note 65, at para. 59: 
… [T]he Provinces took their interest in land subject to “any Interest other than that of 
the Province in the same” (s. 109). The duty to consult and accommodate here at issue is 
grounded in the assertion of Crown sovereignty which pre-dated the Union. It follows 
that the Province took the lands subject to this duty. It cannot therefore claim that s. 35 
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Tsilhqot’in case now demonstrates, Aboriginal title confirms land rights 
which are constitutionally protected under the Constitution Act, 1982. As 
such, section 92(13) or 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867 should not be 
construed in ways which automatically overturn Aboriginal peoples’ pre-
existing title and land management regimes.  
Aboriginal title in British Columbia is a prior and senior right to 
land.94 It stems from the fact that Aboriginal peoples used and occupied 
land prior to European arrival.95 It also flows from constitutional 
principles which recognize that these rights have not been extinguished.96 
Indigenous law created Aboriginal title as an independent legal interest 
prior to Canada and the province coming into existence.97 Tsilhqot’in law 
has a pre-existing and continuing force which was prominent in 
establishing title.98 Tsilhqot’in Elders testified about the continuity of 
their ways of life in their own language using their legal traditions.99  
 
 
                                                                                                                       
deprives it of powers it would otherwise have enjoyed. As stated in St. Catherine’s 
Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.), lands in the 
Province are “available to [the Province] as a source of revenue whenever the estate of 
the Crown is disencumbered of the Indian title” (p. 59). … 
94  Delgamuukw, supra, note 15, at para. 114: 
… aboriginal title … arises from possession before the assertion of British sovereignty, 
whereas normal estates, like fee simple, arise afterward: see Kent McNeil, “The Meaning 
of Aboriginal Title”, in Michael Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in 
Canada (1997), 135, at p. 144. This idea has been further developed in Roberts v. 
Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322, where this Court unanimously held at p. 340 that 
“aboriginal title pre-dated colonization by the British and survived British claims of 
sovereignty” (also see Guerin, at p. 378). 
95  Van der Peet, supra, note 66, at paras. 43-45. 
96  Guerin v. Canada, [1984] S.C.J. No. 45, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, at 379-82 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Guerin”]. 
97  Id., at 385 (Aboriginal title is an independent legal interest). For a general discussion of 
the Indigenous law foundations of Aboriginal title see Ulla Secher, Aboriginal Customary Law:  
A Source of Common Law Title to Land (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014). 
98  Continuity of Aboriginal traditions and customs is an integral part of Aboriginal rights 
law: Mitchell v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.), [2001] S.C.J. No. 33, [2001] 1 
S.C.R. 911, at para. 12 (S.C.C.) and Connolly v. Woolrich, [1867] Q.J. No. 1, 17 R.J.R.Q. 75,  
at 79 (Que. S.C.), affd as Johnstone v. Connelly, [1869] J.Q. no 1, 1 R.L. 253 (Que. C.A.). 
Continuity of occupation as part of this broader doctrine is necessary to prove Aboriginal title,  
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at paras. 45-46, 57. For further information concerning 
Indigenous law and continuity in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case see Hamar Foster, “One Good 
Thing: Law, Elevator Etiquette and Litigating Aboriginal Rights in Canada” (2010) 37 Advoc. Q. 
66-86; Dwight G. Newman, “Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia and Civil Justice: Analyzing 
the Procedural Interaction of Evidentiary Principles and Aboriginal Oral History” (2005) 43 
Alberta L. Rev. 433. 
99  Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2465, 65 R.P.R. (4th) 1, 2007 
BCSC 1700, at paras. 149, 167, 176, 360, 362, 381, 397, 399, 403, 431-435 (B.C.S.C.). 
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Indigenous law was key to establishing a sufficiency of Indigenous social 
organization which was necessary to prove title.100 Tsilhqot’in rules of 
conduct were central to proving that they historically and presently 
occupied land in the contested region.101 In making these statements the 
Supreme Court implicitly affirmed that Indigenous legal traditions can 
give rise to enforceable obligations within Canadian law.102 Social 
organization should be treated as a synonym for self-government.103 
When a Nation organizes itself socially on a territorial basis, and through 
its own laws controls land, makes decisions about its use, and excludes 
others, we should conclude that such a Nation governs itself.104 First  
 
                                                                                                                       
100  Id., at para. 429: 
‘… the Tsilhqot’in had laws, and that those for which there is evidence appear to have 
been broadly similar to the laws of other many North American Aboriginal groups’. … 
[T]here was evidence ‘that supports the view that chiefs had specific lands within 
Tsilhqot’in territory and that these lands descended on some sort of hereditary principle.’ 
I too am satisfied that an examination of the historical records leads to a conclusion that 
Tsilhqot’in people did consider the land to be their land. They also had a concept of 
territory and boundaries, although this appears to have been enlarged following the 
movements of the mid-nineteenth century. 
101  Id., at paras. 433-434: 
Some of the stories and legends told to the Court by Tsilhqot’in elders include: Lhin 
Desch’osh, the legend of how the land was transformed and the animals made less 
dangerous; Ts’il?os and ?Eniyud; How Raven Stole the Sun; A Story of Raven Stealing 
Fire; The Story of Salmon Boy; The Story of the Woman and the Bear; The Story of 
Lady Rock; The Story of Qitl’ax Xen, a boy raised by his grandmother; The Story of 
Guli, the Skunk; A Story About a Brother and a Sister; A Story About an Owl; Two 
Sisters and the Stars; and; Frog Steals a Baby. 
This is not a complete list but it is representative of the legends I heard. Each carries with 
it an underlying message or moral that is intended to instruct and inform Tsilhqot’in 
people in the way they are to lead their lives. They set out the rules of conduct, a value 
system passed from generation to generation. (Emphasis added) 
See also Id., at para. 431: “Various Tsilhqot’in elders testified about dechen ts’ edilhtan (the 
laws of our ancestors).” 
102  A similar point is made in Val Napoleon, Tsilhqot’in Law of Consent (on file with 
author). See also Jeremy Webber, “The Public-Law Dimension of Indigenous Property Rights” in 
Nigel Bankes & Timo Koivurova, eds., The Proposed Nordic Saami Convention: National and 
International Dimensions of Indigenous Property Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2013), 79. 
103  In Delgamuukw, supra, note 15, at para. 189, Lamer C.J.C. observed: “… the foundation 
of ‘aboriginal title’ was succinctly described by Judson J. in Calder v. Attorney-General of British 
Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313, where, at p. 328, he stated: ‘the fact is that when the settlers came, the 
Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for 
centuries.’” (emphasis added) 
104  For a discussion of contemporary Tsilhqot’in legal traditions as they relate to governance 
see Hadley Friedland, Jessica Asch, Maegan Hough, Renee McBeth, Al Hanna, from the Indigenous 
Law Research Unit, Tsilhqot’in Legal Traditions Report (2014) (unpublished, archived with Val 
Napoleon and Tsilhqot’in National Government). For related materials see “Revitalizing Indegenous 
Laws”, Indigenous Bar Association, online: <http://indigenousbar.ca/indigenouslaw/>. 
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Nations governance is an important dimension of Aboriginal title.  
It cannot not be proven or exercised without this broader dimension 
being present. 
Furthermore, as noted, through the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision we 
now know that the Crown in right of the province of British Columbia 
does not possess beneficial interests in lands subject to Aboriginal title. 
Crown interests in timber, minerals and other land uses on Aboriginal 
title lands are now prohibited, subject to a high justificatory standard.105 
Thus, within territories where Aboriginal title is recognized, private 
ownership in these areas might have to be attenuated where it derives 
from a faulty Crown grant. Private land ownership may have to give-way 
to unextinguished Aboriginal title and territorial Aboriginal governance 
of these lands. Since Tsilhqot’in land was not “terra nullius” when the 
Crown purported to grant “ownership” to non-Tsilhqot’in people, the fact 
that the land was and is owned by the Tsilhqot’in Nation undermines the 
legitimacy if not the legality of the Crown’s grant.106 
Thus, Crown grants to so-called private owners might be 
presumptively (though not absolutely) void or voidable.107 As mentioned, 
this is because the Crown did not constitutionally possess a legal interest 
which allowed it to grant un-surrendered Aboriginal land to non-
Aboriginal peoples in the first instance. It must be remembered that 
private land ownership on Aboriginal title lands is derived from faulty 
Crown grants. If a person possesses a faulty land title it cannot pass good 
title to a third party.108 The Crown cannot give to others what it does not 
                                                                                                                       
105  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 112: 
It would be hard to say that the Crown is presently entitled to enjoyment of the lands in 
the way property that is vested in possession would be. Similarly, although Aboriginal 
title can be alienated to the Crown, this does not confer a fixed right to future enjoyment 
in the way property that is vested in interest would. Rather, it would seem that Aboriginal 
title vests the lands in question in the Aboriginal group. 
106  For a discussion of the distinction between legality and legitimacy in Canadian 
constitutional law see Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 
at para. 33 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Secession of Quebec”]: “In our constitutional tradition, legality and 
legitimacy are linked.” 
107  “A ‘void’ patent is said to be one that has no legal effect whatsoever, while a ‘voidable’ 
patent is one that does have effect unless and until it is set aside.” Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [2000] O.J. No. 4804, 51 O.R. (3d) 641, at para. 261 (Ont. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Chippewas of Sarnia”]. See the Chippewas of Sarnia case more generally for a 
discussion of the potential distinction between void and voidable, at paras. 261, 293-295. 
108  For a discussion of the principle of nemo dat quod non habet (title holders can only give 
that which they validly hold) in a recent case see Douglas Harris & Karin Mickelson, “Finding 
Nemo Dat in the Land Title Act: A Comment on Gill v. Bucholtz” (2012) 45 U.B.C. L. Rev. 205. 
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itself possess.109 Despite the potential bluntness of this position I believe 
the law may be more nuanced. The holders of the Crown’s flawed grant 
would not be without remedies and protection. Their presence on 
Aboriginal title land can be protected by Indigenous law, future treaties 
and Canada’s broader constitutional framework.  
As noted in the previous section, Indigenous peoples’ own laws can 
accommodate a wide variety of interests. If private owners have accrued 
entitlements under Indigenous law through their long presence on 
Indigenous lands it could be possible to continue to protect these 
interests. Even though the Crown wrongfully created these interests they 
may nevertheless be sustained under the jurisdiction of an Indigenous 
legal system. As discussed, the Constitution can give force to these 
interests as it regards Indigenous peoples’ own laws as part of Canada’s 
constitutional structure.110 Furthermore the Crown could recognize this 
result through treaties, which would likewise secure constitutional 
protection for private ownership within Indigenous legal systems.  
Understanding that treaties can protect non-Aboriginal property within 
Indigenous legal systems,111 demonstrates that it is not always necessary to 
extinguish Aboriginal interests in favour of Crown interests.112 In the past 
Indigenous peoples have been asked to extinguish or modify their rights 
and title and protect their remaining interests within non-Indigenous 
systems.113 The tables could be turned, as contemplated by the Court’s 
framework. Crown claims and interests in land could be extinguished or 
modified and non-Aboriginal owners could receive their protections 
through Aboriginal legal systems. Reconciliation should not always force 
                                                                                                                       
109  For a discussion of this issue in the Australian context see Kent McNeil, “A Question of 
Title: Has the Common Law Been Misapplied to Dispossess the Aboriginals?” (1990) 16 Monash 
University L. Rev. 91-110. 
110  For a discussion of this issue more generally, John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous 
Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015) (forthcoming) [hereinafter “Borrows, 
‘Canada’s Indigenous Constitution’”]. 
111  In fact, it should be more strongly recognized that Indigenous treaties are a mechanism of 
protecting non-Aboriginal property interests. When Indigenous peoples consent to sharing their land 
with others in peace and friendship, this is a pledge to recognize and affirm non-Aboriginal people’s 
interests in land, that they will create by virtue of Indigenous permission. For more discussion, see 
Office of the Treaty Commissioner, Office of the Treaty History, Statement of Treaty Issues: Treaties 
as a Bridge to the Future (Saskatoon: Office of the Treaty Commission, 1998). 
112  Brian Egan, “Towards Shared Ownership: Property, Geography, and Treaty Making in 
British Columbia“ (2013) 95 Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, 33-50; for a 
similar argument regarding history treaties, see Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay: Treaty and 
Aboriginal Rights in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014). 
113  For an overview of treaty history in Canada, see J.R. Miller, Compact, Contract, 
Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009). 
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the Aboriginal interest to “give-way”. Sometimes it is the Crown or private 
interests which must be modified or eliminated in advancing this goal. The 
symmetry presented by this option takes us deeper into the realm of 
equality. It advances the principle of non-discrimination in transforming 
the parties’ relationship in a more just way. The reciprocity underlying this 
approach should also cause other Canadians to think twice when asking 
Aboriginal peoples to extinguish or modify their interests  knowing that 
the same request may be made of them during negotiations to protect non-
Aboriginal interests.114  
Of course, protecting non-Indigenous land through Indigenous 
governance systems must overcome the long-standing principle that: “Lands 
held pursuant to aboriginal title cannot be transferred, sold or surrendered to 
anyone other than the Crown and, as a result, is inalienable to third 
parties.”115 Courts could tenaciously hold to this principle and either 
invalidate private ownership or deny Aboriginal title over such lands.116 This 
would be unfortunate. Both results seem less than satisfactory because of 
their bluntness and zero-sum implications. This does not advance the spirit 
of reconciliation.117 The Courts should strive to protect each interest, as 
vigorously as possible, with priority being afforded to Aboriginal title 
because of its constitutional undergirding, particularly when compared to the 
non-constitutional aspects of private ownership.  
                                                                                                                       
114  In this respect, insecurity in Aboriginal land rights might be seen as signalling a similar 
insecurity in non-native property rights. Thus, Aboriginal peoples might function as a “canary in a 
coalmine” for other Canadians. As the leading theorist of United States Federal Indian law wrote: 
… the Indian plays much the same role in our American society that the Jews played in 
Germany. Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to poison 
gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our 
treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith. 
Felix S. Cohen, “Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy” (1953) 
62 Yale L.J. 348, at 390. 
115  Delgamuukw, supra, note 15, at para. 113. 
116  It should also be noted that the rule itself, that Aboriginal title can only be surrendered to 
the Crown, while now an important part of Canadian law, was initially a legal fiction invented by 
Marshall J. of the United States Supreme Court to tidy up non-Aboriginal peoples’ claims to 
Aboriginal lands after the revolution. Previous practice in North America recognized that Aboriginal 
peoples could pass good title to non-Indigenous purchasers. The practice was squelched by Marshall J. 
to strengthen federalist interests in the post-Republic period, as part of a broader effort to knit the 
United States more strongly into a centralized political power. For an excellent discussion of this 
history, see Lindsay G. Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossessed 
Indigenous Peoples of Their Land (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
117  A recent discussion of reconciliation in the Canadian context is found in Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada, What We Have Learned: Principles of Truth and Reconciliation 
(Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada, 2015), online: <http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/ 
File/2015/Findings/Principles%20of%20Truth%20and%20Reconciliation.pdf>. 
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This approach more fully embodies the principle of reconciliation 
which underlies Aboriginal rights.118 Safeguarding private ownership 
through Aboriginal people’s management of Aboriginal title lands is 
consistent with Canada’s broader constitutional methodologies which 
strive to apply principles of proportionality, reasonableness, fairness and 
fundamental justice. A “large, liberal and generous” approach in favour 
of Aboriginal rights is warranted.119 Part of this liberality would include 
protecting private land holdings through Aboriginal title through 
Indigenous legal systems. The broader public interest could thus be 
advanced in protecting Aboriginal title lands,120 and this interest includes 
the Aboriginal public too.121 At the same time the general public’s 
interests in land should not create a general prospective rule which could 
be used to dispossess Indigenous peoples of their land through non-
consensual Crown grants.122  
Furthermore, the Crown could negotiate treaties with Indigenous 
peoples to secure the recognition and affirmation of private ownership 
under Crown or Aboriginal protection. This could facilitate 
reconciliation. Since private lands may be affected by Aboriginal title 
rights the Crown now has a greater incentive to enter into treaties with 
First Nations in British Columbia. It can either confirm through 
agreement that private lands are protected under Indigenous peoples’ 
own laws, or it can make arrangements to place private ownership 
explicitly within Crown registry systems. As the United States Supreme 
Court wrote in the seminal case of United States v. Winans, “treaties are 
a grant of rights from the Indians”.123 Until a First Nations grants land 
                                                                                                                       
118  For a fuller discussion of the mutuality underlying reconciliation see Jeffery G. Hewitt, 
“Reconsidering Reconciliation: The Long Game” (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 259. 
119  Sparrow, supra, note 52, at para. 56: “When the purposes of the affirmation of aboriginal 
rights are considered, it is clear that a generous, liberal interpretation of the words in the 
constitutional provision is demanded.” 
120  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at paras. 1, 23, 71, 77, 81, 82, 84, 118, 125, 139. I am not 
clear how the general public interest became a justification for infringing Aboriginal rights when the 
leading case which introduced the infringement analysis said: “We find the ‘public interest’ justification 
to be so vague as to provide no meaningful guidance and so broad as to be unworkable as a test for the 
justification of a limitation on constitutional rights.”; Sparrow, supra, note 52, para. 72. 
121  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 81: “… the compelling and substantial 
objective of the government must be considered from the Aboriginal perspective as well as from the 
perspective of the broader public”. 
122  The Crown cannot presently invoke the public interest and create private rights on 
Aboriginal title lands and expect to prevail: Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 124. 
123  United States v. Winans (1905), 198 U.S. 371, at 381, 25 S. Ct. 662 [hereinafter 
“Winans”]. The United States Supreme Court stated: “In other words, the treaty was not a grant of 
rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them – a reservation of those not granted.” 
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rights to British Columbia to create private ownership rights within an 
Aboriginal title area,124 the power to use and occupy Aboriginal title 
lands is “reserved to the Indians”.125 If Indigenous land was granted 
without a treaty this would problematically imply that such lands were 
terra nullius, a proposition the Supreme Court itself rejected in the 
Tsilhqot’in decision.126 
In the absence of such treaties, Aboriginal title embodies a 
constitutionally protected interest in land,127 which may not be 
immediately registerable under British Columbia’s Land Title Act.128 
Thus, private land holdings held within Aboriginal title land may suffer 
from this same defect unless the parties act to confirm such titles. While 
Aboriginal title has priority over non-Aboriginal property interests by 
virtue of their constitutional protection, this does not mean that a 
declaration of Aboriginal title will automatically defeat non-Aboriginal 
interests and their accommodation within Indigenous legal systems. 
Remember, Aboriginal title is not absolute. Similarly, to repeat, the 
protection of private ownership is also conditional. This is particularly 
the case when land was wrongfully carved out of Aboriginal title 
                                                                                                                       
124  Even within a treaty context First Nations may still have rights to use Crown grants of 
land (such as fee simple lands). See R. v. Badger, [1996] S.C.J. No. 39, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, at 
paras. 54, 58, 60, 65, 66, 68 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Bartleman, [1984] B.C.J. No. 1760, [1984] 3 
C.N.L.R. 114 (B.C.C.A.). 
125  Winans, supra, note 123. 
126  For academic critiques of terra nullius and the doctrine of discovery see Robert J. Miller, 
Jacinta Ruru, Larissa Behrendt & Tracey Lindberg, Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of 
Discovery in the English Colonies (Oxford University Press, 2010); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The 
American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
127  The Supreme Court compares private land with Aboriginal title in the Tsilhqot’in Nation 
decision in para. 109: 
The Act is silent on Aboriginal title land, meaning that there are three possibilities: (1) 
Aboriginal title land is “Crown land”; (2) Aboriginal title land is “private land”; or (3) the 
Forest Act does not apply to Aboriginal title land at all. For the purposes of this appeal, 
there is no practical difference between the latter two. 
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 109. 
128  British Columbia Land Title Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 250. Cases which have denied the 
registration of Aboriginal land interests in provincial and territorial land registries include R. v. 
Paulette, [1976] S.C.J. No. 89, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 628 (S.C.C.); Uukw v. British Columbia, [1986] 
B.C.J. No. 3270, [1986] 4 C.N.L.R. 111 (B.C.S.C.), revd [1987] B.C.J. No. 610, [1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 
173 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1987] S.C.C.A. No. 181, 12 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxiv; 
Lac La Ronge Indian Band v. Beckman, [1990] S.J. No. 218, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Sask. C.A.); 
Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point v. Canada, [1994] O.J. No. 1073, 4 C.N.L.R. 34 (Ont. Gen. 
Div.); James Smith Indian Band v. Saskatchewan (Master of Titles), [1995] S.J. No. 213, 123 D.L.R. 
(4th) 280 (Sask. C.A.); Skeetchestn v. British Columbia (Registrar of Land Titles), [2000] B.C.J. No. 
1916, [2001] 1 C.N.L.R. 310 (B.C.C.A.). 
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territory without Indigenous participation or consent. In the Tsilhqot’in 
Nation decision the Supreme Court wrote that “a direct transfer of 
Aboriginal property rights to a third party - will plainly be a meaningful 
diminution in the Aboriginal group’s ownership right and will amount to 
an infringement that must be justified in cases where it is done without 
Aboriginal consent”.129  
Perhaps, as I am suggesting, an appropriate justification for past non-
consensual infringements of Aboriginal title will see private ownership 
interests incorporated and protected within Indigenous legal systems, 
supported and upheld by the honour of the Crown. In such circumstances 
private ownership will be protected but this does not mean that the 
private interest will rest on Crown law alone;130 so-called private 
ownership would owe its existence to both Indigenous law and the 
common law.131 In these circumstances, unlike Aboriginal title interests, 
private interests on Aboriginal title could be alienable to other parties. 
The land would still be marketable. Mortgages could be secured against 
such lands to facilitate private use. Land use planning and municipal-like 
services could be also provided and managed by the First Nation but this 
would not undermine the owner’s secured interest. First Nations taxation 
of private interests on Aboriginal title lands could not be levied in such a 
way as to amount to expropriation of this interest without justification 
and just compensation: reconciliation, proportionality, reasonableness, 
fairness and fundamental justice would demand that court’s supervise the 
relationship to ensure such outcomes, as I have been arguing. At the 
same time escheat-like provisions would favour the Aboriginal group in 
                                                                                                                       
129  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 124. 
130  In finding guidance about how private ownership and Aboriginal title interacts the Court 
might choose to modify early principles found in the United States Supreme Court case called 
Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, at 593. In that case the Court held 
that a grant of private title purchased directly from the Piankeshaw and Illinois Indians could not be 
sustained in a United States Court. However, the Court affirmatively held that remedies for securing 
titles purchased from the Indians could be pursued under Indian Law. Private ownership in British 
Columbia (in the circumstances I am describing) would not derive from a non-Indigenous source, 
thus distinguishing this article’s example from the Johnson case. At the same time, Indigenous law 
might recognize Crown created rights within Aboriginal title territories and thus provide protection 
for them in these instances. Under this theory the flawed creation of Crown grants to third parties 
could protect these private interests while at the same time justifying this infringement by ensuring 
that Aboriginal title is diminished as minimally as possible in the circumstances. 
131  As the Supreme Court of Canada wrote in Van der Peet, supra, note 66, at para. 42: “a 
morally and politically defensible conception of Aboriginal rights will incorporate both legal 
perspectives”. 
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question and governance and protection of so-called private interests 
could be facilitated through Indigenous law.132  
Note the mutuality embedded in this analysis: Aboriginal title is not 
an absolute right, nor is privately held land with an area of declared 
Aboriginal title an absolute interest. At the same time privately held 
lands in Aboriginal title lands cannot simply remain under Crown 
control, as noted, because the Crown’s grant is flawed  it was created 
within a territory where it did not have the beneficial interest. Indigenous 
law must ex proprio vigore (of their own force) protect private interests, 
or by referential incorporation of these interests through constitutional 
frameworks, treaty arrangements and statutes. The point is that private 
property’s relationship with Aboriginal title may be constitutionally 
protected through Aboriginal governance. In this article I am not trying 
to detail every aspect of the relationship between Aboriginal title and 
private ownership. I am attempting to open space for further discussion 
in light of the Court’s broader framework. I am exploring one path 
opened by the Court when it said Aboriginal title is not absolute. In my 
view, when considering rights to land, the Court’s rejection of absolute 
propositions for Aboriginal parties must also be applied to non-
Aboriginal parties. It must open a space for mutuality and reconciliation. 
This is necessary to create a constitutionally consistent jurisprudence. 
At the same time, constitutionalized Aboriginal title rights should 
obviously trump non-constitutionalized property interests.133 As I have 
argued, to hold otherwise would privilege non-Aboriginal interests over 
rights constitutionally protected within the country’s highest law. This 
would be discriminatory. It would not treat Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal interests in a land in a way that respects the constitutional 
nature of Aboriginal rights. Privileging interests over constitutionally 
protected rights would be contrary to Canada’s normal constitutional 
order. Thus we must not presume “private” ownership would universally 
limit declarations of Aboriginal title rights in Canada. It would be 
passing ironic if non-constitutionalized non-Aboriginal property interests 
were regarded as being absolute relative to Aboriginal title. Such a 
                                                                                                                       
132  This is similar to how Nisga’a law deals with third party interests within their treaty: “If, 
at any time, any parcel of Nisga’a Lands, or any estate or interest in a parcel of Nisga’a Lands, 
finally escheats to the Crown, the Crown will transfer, at no charge, that parcel, estate or interest to 
the Nisga’a Nation.” Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, S.B.C. 1999, c. 2, s. 7. 
133  Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title as a Constitutionally Protected Property Right”, in 
Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of 
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001), at 292. 
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conclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute 
because of the seeming bias such a result would reveal. 
The need for fairness, reasonableness, proportionality and 
reconciliation, accomplished partially through the recognition and 
affirmation of Indigenous law and governance, is a key to understanding 
how private land rights might be interpreted in relation to Aboriginal title 
lands. The Court has been very clear that absolute positions are not 
constitutionally sustainable when section 35(1)’s framework is in force. 
These limitations would likewise be applicable to privately held lands. In 
themselves, private lands do not even enjoy direct constitutional 
protection.134 Nonetheless, through the analysis developed in this article, 
private lands found on Aboriginal title territories would gain enhanced 
protection and enjoy a security of tenure through the constitutional 
means described herein. On declared title lands private property would 
gain constitutionally secure status through their relationship with 
Aboriginal title lands. 
4. Distinguishing The Chippewas of the Sarnia Case 
The Court’s nascent framework for dealing with Aboriginal title has 
significant implications for privately held land within Aboriginal 
territories in British Columbia. Failing to hold private ownership as 
absolutely inviolable in the face of declarations of Aboriginal title would 
change “settled” expectations.  
“Private” property owners potentially face a change in the source or 
scope of their tenures. There is no escaping this issue. This creates 
problems for such land owners in the short term. Even if Indigenous 
governance was formally accredited by the courts and/or treaties were 
signed, to place these lands more securely within Crown registries or 
within Indigenous legal systems, it would take time to accomplish these 
objectives. Aboriginal peoples possess greater bargaining power in 
                                                                                                                       
134  The fact that there are limitations on Aboriginal title within Canada’s constitutional 
framework is not to detract from Aboriginal title’s great strength. Aboriginal title is a broad right to 
use land for a wide variety of purposes. While this is a very powerful right, even with this strength 
we must reject essentialism in understanding Aboriginal title. Likewise, under the Court’s 
framework, we must also reject essentialism in relation to Crown land rights, and the Crown’s 
creation of private land rights. The Court has rejected a priori determinations in this field. When 
Aboriginal title is raised each case engages a contextual inquiry. Thus, the answer to whether private 
property is affected by Aboriginal title may be: it depends on the circumstances of the case. For an 
extended discussion about the problems with essentialism in Aboriginal law, see Borrows, 
“Canada’s Indigenous Constitution”, supra, note 110. 
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relation to private land than was the case prior to the Tsilhqot’in Nation 
decision. Aboriginal title implications may constrain the Crown in acting 
quickly because it does not have the last word in this instance. It will also 
take time to test how Indigenous Nations’ own laws would protect 
Crown-derived “private” property interests within Aboriginal title 
regimes. Even if private property owners were generously compensated 
by the Crown for the diminishment in their interests caused by the 
Crown’s wrongful prior appropriation of Aboriginal title lands, it would 
take time to put these mechanisms in place.  
There is no question that this creates unhealthy uncertainty for private 
owners in British Columbia. On the other hand First Nations continue to 
suffer losses if delays perpetuate other people’s claims to Aboriginal title 
lands. They also encounter troubling and debilitating uncertainty. At one 
level it might be said that the parties face a zero-sum game, where victory 
for one group appears to be a substantial loss for the other group. 
Indigenous peoples might say “welcome to the club”. Aboriginal 
titles have long been insecure because of the privileging of non-
Aboriginal interests in land.135 Now, the polarity may be reversed. The 
illegal settlement of British Columbia upset millennia-old expectations 
concerning land use and occupation within Aboriginal territories.136 The 
fact that this was contrary to British Proclamations and the common 
law,137 as well as Indigenous peoples’ own laws,138 only made matters 
                                                                                                                       
135  For an excellent article discussing the various ways in which Aboriginal land rights and 
interests have been treated by the courts, legislatures and through treaties, see Nigel Bankes, Sharon 
Mascher & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “Recognition of Aboriginal Title and Its Relationship with 
Settler State Land Titles Systems“ (2014) 47 U.B.C. L. Rev. 829. 
136  Cole Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism Resistance, and Reserves in British 
Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002). 
137  For a discussion of how the Royal Proclamation and common law should have protected 
Aboriginal lands rights, see Brian Slattery, “The Aboriginal Constitution” (2015) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 319. 
138  For a statement indicating the unlawfulness of British Columbia’s taking of Aboriginal 
lands from an Indigenous legal perspective, see “Memorial To Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Premier of the 
Dominion of Canada”, from the Chiefs of the Shuswap, Okanagan and Couteau Tribes of British 
Columbia, Presented at Kamloops, B.C., August 25, 1910, online: <http://shuswapnation.org/to-sir-
wilfrid-laurier/>. 
What have we received for our good faith, friendliness and patience? Gradually as the 
whites of this country became more and more powerful, and we less and less powerful, 
they little by little changed their policy towards us, and commenced to put restrictions on 
us. Their government or chiefs have taken every advantage of our friendliness, weakness 
and ignorance to impose on us in every way. They treat us as subjects without any 
agreement to that effect, and force their laws on us without our consent and irrespective 
of whether they are good for us or not. They say they have authority over us. They have 
broken down our old laws and customs (no matter how good) by which we regulated 
ourselves. 
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worse.139 Indigenous peoples in British Columbia have long claimed that 
their titles have been insecure through the unlawful taking of their 
lands.140 Compensation or incorporation within provincial property law 
regimes is not likely to reduce this experience of loss and alienation. Just 
as non-Aboriginal peoples might in some future day feel aggrieved if 
their land is held under Indigenous ownership or control, Indigenous 
peoples have long felt that most every gain for non-Aboriginal people 
resulted in a direct loss for their own communities. 
We must not hide behind the language of reconciliation and pretend 
that each interaction will always be mutually beneficial at a micro-level, 
even if this is the overall macro-level result. Some people will lose in this 
context while other people will gain. In macro-level terms the historic 
losers in this process have been Aboriginal peoples. In the future, non-
Aboriginal people might suffer some losses (even as others gain longer 
term land rights security)  if the Court applies the law in a non-
discriminatory manner.141 This is what happens in a market context when 
government subsidies for private ownership relative to Aboriginal title 
                                                                                                                       
139  For a description of the colonial displacement of Indigenous peoples in British Columbia 
see Cole Harris, The Resettlement of British Columbia (Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 1997) 68-102; 
Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics of British Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990) 
39-52, 96-113. 
140  See the representative quote from 1888 given by David McKay in Calder v. British 
Columbia (Attorney-General), [1973] S.C.J. No. 56, [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145, at 358 
(S.C.C.): 
… what we don’t like about the Government is their saying this: “We will give you this 
much land”. How can they give it when it is our own? We cannot understand it. They 
have never bought it from us or our forefathers. They have never fought and conquered 
our people and taken the land in that way, and yet they say now that they will give us so 
much land -- our own land. These chiefs do not talk foolishly, they know the land is their 
own; our forefathers for generations and generations past had their land here all around 
us; chiefs have had their own hunting grounds, their salmon streams, and places where 
they got their berries; it has always been so. It is not only during the last four or five years 
that we have seen the land; we have always seen and owned it; it is no new thing, it has 
been ours for generations. If we had only seen it for twenty years and claimed it as our 
own, it would have been foolish, but it has been ours for thousands of years. If any 
strange person came here and saw the land for twenty years and claimed it, he would be 
foolish. 
141  Canadian law has not always developed in a way which is non-discriminatory for 
Indigenous peoples: see Sparrow, supra, note 52, at para. 49: “And there can be no doubt that over 
the years the rights of the Indians were often honoured in the breach.” For a discussion of judicial 
power can be exercised in troubling ways for Indigenous peoples, given the uneven allocations of 
political, legal and economic power in British Columbia, see Robin Ridington, “Fieldwork in 
Courtroom 53: A Witness to Delgamuukw” in Frank Cassidy, ed., Aboriginal Title in British 
Columbia: Delgamuukw v. The Queen (Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan Books, 1992), at 208; Leslie Hall 
Pinder, The Carriers of No: After the Land Claims Trial (Vancouver: Lazara Press, 1991); Boyce 
Richardson, Drum Beat: Anger and Renewal in Indian Country (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1989). 
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are removed. As noted, this would reverse the general polarity of how 
benefits have flowed in Canadian law. We must not overestimate these 
changes however: Indigenous peoples continue to face substantial 
disadvantages and experience unequal access to political, economic and 
legal power relative to the general population.142  
At the same time, we must not lose sight of the fact that 
reconciliation is the constitutional value which animates the recognition 
and affirmation of Aboriginal rights.143 As the Supreme Court observed 
in the Mikisew Cree case: “The fundamental objective of the modern law 
of aboriginal and treaty rights is the reconciliation of aboriginal peoples 
and non-aboriginal peoples and their respective claims, interests and 
ambitions.”144 As far as possible Courts, Parliaments, Legislatures and 
Indigenous governments must do all they can to ensure no one is unjustly 
deprived of the benefits of their long-settled expectations regarding land 
use and occupation  and this goes for both Aboriginal title holders and 
third-party holders or private land interests. Furthermore, though there 
are great temptations to act otherwise, most Indigenous peoples 
recognize that the dispossession of their non-Aboriginal neighbours 
would not be just, fair, honourable or in accord with their society’s own 
law and morality.145  
“Welcome to the club” may seem like an appropriate first response 
when considering the insecurity of non-native title holders in the face of 
ongoing colonialism. Fortunately this view is not likely to prevail. 
Indigenous peoples are reasoning and reasonable people, which can be 
expressed through law.146 Though they are extremely dissatisfied with 
and actively reject British Columbia’s colonialism many First Nations 
have been working to positively transform their relationships with the 
                                                                                                                       
142  National Aboriginal Economic Development Board, Aboriginal Economic Progress 
Report, June 2015, online: <http://www.naedb-cndea.com/reports/NAEDB-progress-report-june-
2015.pdf>. 
143  M. Walters, “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” in  
W. Kymlicka & B. Bashir, eds., The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 165. 
144  Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.  
No. 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388, at para. 1 (S.C.C.). 
145  See the statement of various Indian Chiefs in Michael Asch, Home and Native Land: 
Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: Methuen, 1984) and Michael Asch, On 
Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2014). 
146  Discussion about the role of Indigenous legal orders in Canadian law is found in 
Senwung Luk, “The Law of the Land: New Jurisprudence on Aboriginal Title” (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 289. 
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province.147 First Nations own internal legal processes and governance 
mechanisms need further activation and formal recognition to create 
justice in our land  not just for themselves, but for non-Aboriginal 
people as well. 
Section 35(1) “does not promise immunity from government 
regulation in a society that, in the twentieth century, is increasingly more 
complex, interdependent and sophisticated”.148 As noted, this principle 
flows from the fact that “[i]n the Canadian legal tradition, no right is 
absolute”.149 As the Ontario Court of Appeal observed in the Chippewas 
of Sarnia case: it is a “basic principle of our legal system that the right 
asserted by the claiming party must be considered in relation to the rights 
of others. The claiming party cannot not claim entitlement to the 
mechanical grant of an automatic remedy without regard to  
the consequences to the rights of others that might flow by reason of the 
complaining party’s own conduct, including any delay in asserting the 
claim.”150 This statement, which was directed at Aboriginal peoples, can 
be “stood on its head”. Its implications can be reversed. As non-
Aboriginal peoples make private claims in relation to Aboriginal title 
land  private owners cannot automatically be granted entitlements 
without weighing the consequences of these actions for Aboriginal 
peoples. While the Ontario Court of Appeal found that Aboriginal title 
rights were not absolute  this same statement should be applied with 
even greater strength to non-Aboriginal land interests (they are not 
absolute because such interests are not constitutionally protected).  
In the Chippewas of Sarnia case, which is distinguishable from the 
situation in British Columbia, the calibration of Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal interests weighed in favour of non-native property holders.151 
It was held that Aboriginal land rights were not absolute. As a result, 
remedies to which Aboriginal peoples were otherwise entitled were 
                                                                                                                       
147  By way of example, the First Nations Summit has been actively involved over the past  
20 years in seeking to reconcile with British Columbia. They have taken a leadership role in facilitating 
treaty negotiations under the British Columbia Treaty Commission, crafting a “New Relationship” 
with the province, and negotiating the 2006 Kelowna Accord. Unfortunately, each of these issues has 
or is floundering. For more information on British Columbia’s recent political history between First 
Nations and the British Columbia Crown see Tony Penikett, Reconciliation: First Nations Treaty 
Making in British Columbia (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 2009); Christopher McKee, Treaty 
Talks in British Columbia: Building a New Relationship, 3d ed. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009). 
148  Sparrow, supra, note 52, at para. 65. 
149  Chippewas of Sarnia, supra, note 107, at para. 263. 
150  Chippewas of Sarnia, supra, note 107, at para. 264. 
151  For a review and critique of this case, see Kent McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in 
Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial Discretion” (2001-2002) 33 Ottawa L. Rev. 301-46. 
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withheld from them. The Chippewa had initially sold their land to private 
individuals contrary to the Royal Proclamation, but the Crown Court 
subsequently patented it through an order-in-council.152 This was 
contrary to law, but equity intervened to protect the actions of “innocent” 
non-Chippewa purchasers who traced their title to a faulty Crown deed. 
While the Crown’s deeds were flawed (because the Crown patented land 
it did not purchase from the Indians, contrary to its own constitutional 
rules), the Court nevertheless sustained non-Aboriginal land interests 
derived from these faulty grants.153 Thus, the Court held that non-native 
people were entitled to prevail over the Chippewa. This is because 
equity, which partially under-gird Aboriginal title, also applied to 
validate non-native people’s wrongfully-acquired lands.154 The Court 
found that the Chippewa did not sue the land owners within the allotted 
period to defend recognition of their land rights.155 The Chippewa grant 
of title to non-Crown purchasers was thus sustained. Non-native grantees 
were held secure in their lands because the Chippewa’s prior actions 
coupled with the doctrines of laches and acquiescence applied against the 
Chippewa of the Sarnia. Equity preserved non-native title in the face of 
what would otherwise be an Aboriginal entitlement to the land.  
In the Chippewas of Sarnia case the Ontario Court of Appeal was 
keen to ensure that the “so-called” third party “good faith purchaser for 
value without notice” was not prejudiced through the delay of Aboriginal 
peoples in bringing their claims to court.156 Thus, the Chippewa did not 
succeed in securing a remedy in relation to land to which they were 
otherwise entitled. Equity’s operation deprived them of what would have 
been rightfully theirs through the operation of other legal principles.157  
                                                                                                                       
152  Chippewas of Sarnia, supra, note 107, at paras. 11, 47, 107-140 
153  In this case the Crown did not follow its own rules which required that a surrender of 
Aboriginal title land to non-native people could only be received by the Crown. In the Chippewas  
of Sarnia case the Crown and Aboriginal peoples wrongfully acquiesced to a private purchase of 
Aboriginal title land, which was subsequently resold to contemporary non-native land owners who 
traced their title to the Crown’s wrongful actions. 
154  Chippewas of Sarnia, supra, note 107, at paras. 284-291. 
155  Thus the equitable doctrine of laches and acquiescence defeated the Indigenous interest in 
the Chippewas of Sarnia case. Chippewas of Sarnia, supra, note 107, at paras. 297-302. 
156  Chippewas of Sarnia, supra, note 107, at paras. 303-309. 
157  Furthermore, unlike the Chippewas of Sarnia case, there will be no evidence throughout 
most of British Columbia that there was ever any surrender to third parties. In the Chippewas of 
Sarnia case, Chiefs of the Nation gave a grant to a third party and not the Crown. When the Ontario 
Court of appeal applied the rules of equity in the Chippewas of Sarnia case, this fact counted against 
them; no such thing occurred in most of British Columbia. Furthermore, British Columbia could not 
extinguish Aboriginal title through fee simple interests in the province. Thus, the facts which denied 
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The situation in most of British Columbia is far different from the 
facts at issue in the Chippewas of Sarnia case. Thus, the case is 
distinguishable. The Chippewa of the Sarnia transferred their lands 
directly to non-Crown purchasers in an earlier period of their history. In 
British Columbia there were few, if any, transfers of land by Indigenous 
peoples to non-Crown agents. In fact, there are very few transfers of land 
to the Crown throughout the province, as treaties were not pursued 
except in rare instances.158  
The same rules of equity which deprived Aboriginal title owners of 
entitlement to their lands in the Chippewas of Sarnia case should 
likewise operate to vacate, diminish or change non-Aboriginal property 
interests in British Columbia, as the case may be. As the Grace Islet 
example demonstrates, First Nations in the province have done nothing 
to contribute to their loss. While non-Aboriginal claimants in Ontario 
and British Columbia might be characterized as “innocent third party 
purchasers for value”, private property “owners” in British Columbia 
cannot trace their title to any Aboriginal acquiescence at any point in 
history. Furthermore, the same principles of equity which held 
Aboriginal entitlements in Ontario were not absolute  should recognize 
non-Aboriginal property interests are subject to equity’s same reach  
and thus are also not absolute. Equity cannot only run in one direction, 
nor should it only benefit more powerful parties. Equity should also 
benefit Indigenous peoples.159 
Aboriginal peoples in most parts of British Columbia are “innocent 
third-party suppliers of land who received no value”.  
Thus, this article suggests that Chippewas of Sarnia’s polarity should 
be reversed. This would enable Aboriginal peoples to secure remedies in 
regard to so-called private property when the Crown has acted to deprive 
Aboriginal peoples of the benefit of their title lands. The observation in 
the Chippewas of Sarnia case that “in Canadian law, that no legal title  
is absolute”, should apply as strongly to non-Aboriginal interests as  
to Aboriginal title rights. Thus, when considering wrongly acquired  
                                                                                                                       
the Chippewas of Sarnia remedy for wrongful Crown grants are very different in the case of British 
Columbia, where treaty making did not have much strength. 
158  Historic treaties were signed on Vancouver Island and the Peace River district of British 
Columbia. Contemporary treaties have been signed by the Nisga’a, Maanulth and Tsawwassen First 
Nations. 
159  For a fuller discussion of equity’s role in Aboriginal contexts see Leonard I. Rotman, 
Parallel Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown-Native Relationship in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1996). 
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non-native property interests, the law should characterize “private” 
interests in light of the fact that a declaration of Aboriginal title presumes 
that so-called private interests were wrongfully created to the prejudice 
of Aboriginal parties.  
Thus we must conclude that “non-native people do not possess an 
automatic entitlement to their land without regard to the consequences to 
the rights” of Aboriginal peoples. To decide otherwise would be 
inequitable. Remember, Aboriginal title interests are now recognized as 
the senior, prior interest in land. Despite the fact that Tsilhqot’in and 
other Aboriginal title rights will only be more recently recognized in 
British Columbia, this does not undermine the fact that they pre-existed 
the assertion of sovereignty and continue to the present day.  
5. Concluding Thoughts: Implications of Non-Absolutism  
Reconciliation and the Consequences of Context 
Thus, in the absence of treaties, non-Aboriginal property interests in 
British Columbia within Aboriginal title territories should only be assessed 
in relation to constitutionally recognized and affirmed Aboriginal title 
rights.160 Through a brief examination of Tsilhqot’in’s framework I have 
concluded that a declaration of Aboriginal title can be made even in cases 
where private land interests are located in the claimed territory. The 
Tsilhqot’in decision, as I must again stress, did not directly consider the 
issue. Nevertheless the case is part of a developing framework which 
eschews absolutism and leads to the search for more nuanced positions. In 
this context I have argued that private property should not be automatically 
immune from a declaration of Aboriginal title.161 
                                                                                                                       
160  As noted, Aboriginal title rights are part of the highest laws of the land under s. 35(1) of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. As I have noted previously, non-Aboriginal property rights are not 
protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and therefore cannot claim 
constitutional protection. While legislatures have jurisdiction over “property and civil rights” under 
s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867, if a province exercised power under s. 92 in a manner which 
conflicts with s. 35(1) the private property interest would have to give way. The Aboriginal title 
interest would be paramount in these instances, subject to the Crown’s ability to justifiably infringe 
(not extinguish) Aboriginal rights under s. 35(1). Such justification requires that the Crown have a 
valid legislative objective in diminishing Aboriginal rights and that the Crown’s honour in such 
infringements is preserved. 
161  If “occupation is a context-specific inquiry” for Aboriginal peoples (Tsilhqot’in Nation, 
supra, note 2, at para. 37), private land interests within the same territories must also be considered 
by reference to specific histories, and not essentialized principles. This is how consultation and 
accommodation proceeds under s. 35(1). It would be a discriminatory exercise of law to universalize 
the common law and contextualize Indigenous law. If any law is to be universalized, which I am not 
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There might be many concerns raised about this paper’s conclusion. 
First, it might be said that the potential existence of Aboriginal title 
throughout British Columbia places a cloud over non-Aboriginal titles. 
I acknowledge this may be true. In fact, it is one of the reasons I chose to 
write this article  to acknowledge “the elephant in the room”.162 
Aboriginal peoples have long felt that their title was under a cloud. 
Aboriginal title has not enjoyed the same clarity or certainty as other land 
interests in Canada. This has not been a happy experience. Aboriginal 
land values have been reduced and their investments have been 
diminished. The conclusions in this article (to mix metaphors) place the 
shoe on the other foot; when non-Aboriginal people experience similar 
circumstances they might more seriously advocate for meaningful 
treaties. Perhaps the Court’s vision of reconciliation will be enhanced 
because the parties are placed in a somewhat similar position, at least in 
this instance.163  
The Tsilhqot’in decision, by creating ambiguity for non-native peoples’ 
property interests, might recalibrate power between the parties. I hope it 
does so in a way which simultaneously strengthens Indigenous peoples hand 
while enhancing and protecting non-Indigenous land interests. The potential 
subjection of private ownership to a declaration of Aboriginal title might 
provide greater incentives to secure mutually acceptable treaty or other 
settlements, though it could just as easily deter courts from ever declaring 
                                                                                                                       
advocating, one would think it would be Indigenous law. It is the first law of the territory which has 
become Canada. One would thus think that subsequent legal assertions would be subject and 
secondary to these first laws, and thus more context-specific. 
162  For an excellent article which develops an extended “elephant” metaphor in 
Aboriginal/Crown relationships, see Kerry Wilkins, “Reasoning with the Elephant: The Crown, Its 
Counsel and Aboriginal Law in Canada” (2015) Indigenous L.J. (forthcoming): 
The aim of the present discussion is to help in a small way to explicate the 
preoccupations of this metaphorical (but by no means imaginary) elephant and, perhaps 
in particular, to illuminate some of the context within which government lawyers deal, 
while at work, with Canadian law about indigenous peoples. Like it or not, and like them 
or not, government lawyers will very often be this elephant’s spokespeople in 
conversations of consequence that take place with aboriginal communities. One has a 
better chance of getting somewhere in such conversations if one understands better how 
things seem to them. 
163  This is not to ignore the significant advantage in power that the Crown has relative to 
Indigenous peoples by virtue of their greater capitalization and control of wider issues of governance 
in Canada. The one small yet significant inroad suggested in this article to rebalance 
Crown/Aboriginal power nevertheless exists within a context where the Crown daily participates in 
the reproduction of colonial relationships throughout the province and country. For a discussion of 
colonialism’s continuing grip over Aboriginal peoples in Canada, see Glen Coulthard, Red Skin, 
White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2014). 
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Aboriginal title, which would be discriminatory. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly written that negotiation is the preferred avenue for reconciling 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples.164 If declarations and negotiations 
do not occur in British Columbia ambiguity will increase. 
Second, in an Aboriginal context there are legal doctrines which help 
us deal with ambiguity. If we do not know how to characterize so-called 
private interests in the face of Aboriginal title we should conclude that 
the law is ambiguous. Constitutionally speaking, ambiguity would favour 
Aboriginal title rights over non-Aboriginal property interests. In 
Gladstone, the Supreme Court wrote: “Section 35(1) must be given a 
generous, large and liberal interpretation and uncertainties, ambiguities 
or doubts should be resolved in favour of the natives.”165 These 
constitutionalized canons of construction are necessary to advance 
reconciliation. They are appropriate counter-weights to Canada’s 
historical and present manifestations of colonialism, racism and 
subordination experienced by Aboriginal peoples.166 Courts must admit 
that racism and other forms of subordination have informed the 
development of property law in Canada to the detriment of Aboriginal 
peoples.167 This has created injustice. This has led to ambiguity. The 
ambiguous nature of so-called private ownership in territories where 
Aboriginal title has been declared should cause the courts to resist 
universalizing non-native prioritization as a protected interest. It should 
cause the courts to recognize that Canada has created ambiguity through 
its unjust treatment of Aboriginal peoples which requires taking a large, 
liberal and generous approach to their resolution, in favour of Aboriginal 
peoples.  
                                                                                                                       
164  Haida Nation, supra, note 65, at para. 14: 
While Aboriginal claims can be and are pursued through litigation, negotiation is a 
preferable way of reconciling state and Aboriginal interests. 
See also Sparrow, supra, note 52, at para. 53: 
Section 35(1), at the least, provides a solid constitutional base upon which subsequent 
negotiations can take place. It also affords aboriginal peoples constitutional protection 
against provincial legislative power. 
165  Gladstone, supra, note 52, at para. 133. 
166  For a discussion of Aboriginal rights as a counterweight to Crown power see Sparrow, 
supra, note 52, at paras. 65 and 54: 
The constitutional recognition afforded by the provision therefore gives a measure of 
control over government conduct and a strong check on legislative power…. 
..... 
‘It renounces the old rules of the game under which the Crown established courts of law 
and denied those courts the authority to question sovereign claims made by the Crown.’ 
167  The Court has to use stronger words than found in Sparrow, supra, note 51, at para. 49: “And 
there can be no doubt that over the years the rights of the Indians were often honoured in the breach.” 
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Of course, we might (problematically) conclude that there is 
absolutely no ambiguity in Canada’s treatment of Aboriginal peoples 
land and its relationship to private ownership. It may seem very clear to 
some people that historically Aboriginal peoples’ land rights were meant 
to be subordinated in Canadian law. While this view may or may not be 
true,168 it is exceedingly problematic.169 It does not uphold the Honour of 
the Crown.170 “It is imperative in today’s world that the common law 
should neither be nor be seen to be frozen in an age of racial 
discrimination.”171 To uphold this system without repudiating its roots is 
to uphold the consequences of racism in the presently unjust allocation of 
property interests in contemporary British Columbia.172  
The same crisis the Supreme Court noted in regard to Aboriginal 
peoples’ experience with the criminal justice is present in Aboriginal 
peoples’ experience with the civil justice system (which includes 
Canada’s property laws).173 British Columbia’s property law system 
empowers a continuing dispossession of Aboriginal peoples. 
Governments and private owners are perpetually enriched through 
“owning” land, which has never been sold by Indigenous peoples. The 
wrongful appropriation of lands and resources has impoverished 
Indigenous peoples. Despite the tremendous faith some Indigenous 
peoples continue to place in Canada’s legal system, their mistreatment has 
also nourished distrust, enmity and fear of the state and its inhabitants. If 
this is not regarded as a crisis then the term has no meaning.  
Despite these problems it might nevertheless (problematically) be 
said that non-Aboriginal private lands will and should always be securely 
held under provincial law even in the face of Aboriginal title. In such 
                                                                                                                       
168  Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay: Treaty and Aboriginal Rights in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2014). 
169  Sparrow, supra, note 52, at para. 49: 
As MacDonald J. stated in Pasco v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1986] 1 C.N.L.R. 
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170  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 2, at para. 113: “the honour of the Crown requires it to 
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171  Mabo v. Queensland (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1, at 41-42. 
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ZACC 18, 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC), 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC) (October 14, 2003). 
173  The Supreme Court identified the crisis faced by the criminal justice system, relative to 
Aboriginal peoples, in R. v. Gladue, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 64 (S.C.C.). 
There have been almost as many government reports chronicling Canada’s property and civil rights 
crisis relative to Aboriginal peoples (including Aboriginal title), as there has been in the criminal 
justice sphere. In fact, this crisis is often noted with equal force on both fronts, with so-called 
criminal justice inquiries. 
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instances it could be argued there is simply no ambiguity in this area of 
the law. If this were true we would not require canons of construction to 
favour Aboriginal title. The argumentation necessary to accept this point 
would require some kind of universal statement in favour of non-
Indigenous ownership  in order to eliminate ambiguity. This would 
require placing private ownership in a pre-eminent position relative to 
Aboriginal title, which seems next to impossible because of limitations 
found in section 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867. A declaration that 
private property was universally protected and undiminished in the face 
of Aboriginal title would also have to somehow retroactively accredit 
and accept the validity of wrongfully appropriated Aboriginal land. It 
would have to deal with the issue that private interests were secured 
through the Crown granting something it did not own. The 
extinguishment or unjustifiable infringement of Aboriginal title rights 
implied through this line of reasoning raises numerous legal obstacles,174 
in addition to troubling questions about the Crown’s role in Canada.175 It 
should be rejected.  
Third, as stated at the outset, we must remember that we have long 
known that property interests under common law and statutes in British 
Columbia are less than absolute. Property has been analogized as a 
bundle of rights. Each stick in the bundle can be separated from the 
others in appropriate circumstances when dealing with “private 
interests”. On the “private” side this analogy can be applied even as we 
are careful not to carry it over into an Indigenous context because of 
Aboriginal title’s territorial and governance implications.176 The 
                                                                                                                       
174  Extinguishment of Aboriginal title must be clear and plain, see Sparrow, supra, note 52, 
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the Royal Proclamation (1763). The Aboriginal interest in land that burdens the Crown’s underlying 
title is an independent legal interest, which gives rise to a fiduciary duty on the part of the Crown.” 
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extinguishment of native title rights. This has occurred as claimants must prove that native title’s 
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Tsilhqot’in Nation case has revealed the variegation which exists 
between Aboriginal title and private ownership.177 These differences do 
not always have to be conflictual; there is room for mutual modification. 
So-called private property law recognizes easements, co-ownership, 
joint-ownership and other shared uses.178 Municipal and provincial 
statutes can also lead to limitations of land uses to accommodate other 
users. Aboriginal title could be considered yet another limit on private 
ownership  with the additional weight of its constitutional status. More 
could be done to explore the less-than-absolute nature of non-native 
ownership and find ways to allow private property’s limitations to 
dovetail with Aboriginal title’s strength. The co-existence of Aboriginal 
title and private ownership does not always or usually have to be 
construed as a zero-sum game. Such dichotomization may be deployed 
by critics, but the Courts, Parliaments, Legislatures and Indigenous 
governments can choose other constructions of these rights.  
Moreover, with Aboriginal title now recognized and affirmed new 
forms of property must be recognized to accommodate its existence.179 
Some of those interests would necessarily see private property give way 
to Aboriginal title. Other innovations might see private land interests 
subject to Aboriginal title. Perhaps there might be certain restrictions on 
private property alienation when it exists within an area which is 
                                                                                                                       
“rights and incidents” are sourced in “traditional law and custom”. Then those rights and incidents 
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(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2014), at 522-23; Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 5th ed. 
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2010), at 336-37. 
179  An example of new laws being developed in light of the declaration of Tsilhqot’in title is found 
through the creation of “Dasiqox Tribal Park: Nexwagwez? an – There for us”, online: 
<http://www.dasiqox.org/>. The Tsilhqot’in have also drafted a Mining Policy to advance sustainability: 
see Tŝilhqot’in National Government, Tsi Ts’edetalhdez Gwa Dechen Ts’edilhtan, Mining Policy, July 30, 
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recognized as Aboriginal title land. In such cases, subject to the 
principles of just compensation discussed earlier, some private lands 
might not be able to be sold except to the Aboriginal title holder, thus 
reversing the rule Aboriginal people cannot alienate their land except to 
the Crown.  
Other private interests could interact with Aboriginal title rights to 
preserve both forms of use and occupation, and still allow for the free 
alienation of so-called privately owned land. For example, it would be 
interesting to explore how a sui generis condominium-like form of 
organization might be analogized and transformed in an Aboriginal title 
context. Aboriginal land interests could combine individual and 
collective ownership in new ways, which take inspiration from older 
shared visions of North American settler/Indigenous life.180 Indigenous 
laws that protect both so-called common and private spaces might bring 
these interests together in new and productive ways.181 It would be 
possible to put use and ownership rights together in a manner which 
respects Aboriginal collective spaces alongside private spaces, in 
creating a new kind of strata-type form of organization. This could be 
done by statute if the Crown meets its high justificatory standard, or 
through equity, treaty, the common law or Indigenous law. Each of these 
sources of law continues to be relevant in constructing this sui generis 
area of the law.182 
Furthermore, Indigenous peoples might create sui generis leasehold 
interests for “private” parties in areas where Aboriginal title has been 
recognized. The parties might use treaties, statutes, equity, common law 
and Indigenous law, all within the broader constitutional framework 
highlighted herein. This would bring British Columbians full circle. 
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When Governor Douglas dealt with Aboriginal title and treaty issues in 
the province’s pre-colonial regimes he intended that First Nations should 
be recognized as possessing the power to lease their reserved lands to 
non-native settlers.183  
Finally, in making all these points related to the reconciliation of 
Aboriginal title and private rights, I readily acknowledge the non-legal 
dimensions of this issue.184 Significant forces are often arrayed against 
Indigenous peoples as numerical minorities in Canada. Indigenous 
peoples possess much fewer capital resources. They are underrepresented 
in political, media, social, economic and other forums. They are not 
usually found in places where power is channelled, generated, 
manipulated and exercised. There are both obvious and imperceptible 
power differentials between Aboriginal peoples on one side, and the 
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Crown and private owners on the other. The relationship between the 
parties is severely unbalanced; it strongly favours non-Aboriginal 
interests. This realpolitik should not be minimized, particularly when 
discussing private property, which seemingly lies at the heart of this 
agglomeration of power.  
Nothing in this article should cause us to turn our gaze away from 
these raw truths. The deck is stacked against Aboriginal peoples when it 
comes to securing declarations of Aboriginal title in the face of private 
ownership. Sound doctrinal frameworks, while necessary, are not 
sufficient to positively transform our relationships. Yet, at the same time, 
we should also acknowledge that the legal system itself is meant to 
operate in a manner which is free of bias and without prejudice and 
prejudgment.185 Courts aspire to explain, persuade and justify their 
positions rather than resort to raw power in generating their reasons.186 
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, in particular, “renounces the 
old rules of the game under which the Crown established courts of law 
and denied those courts the authority to question sovereign claims made 
by the Crown”.187 Whether these aspirations can be realized lies in the 
hands of non-Aboriginal judges and others with much more power than 
myself. This article stands as an invitation to face and address these 
opportunities and obstacles in light of our Constitution’s central 
commitments to the rule of law. It pleads for an approach which places 
respect at the centre of our relationships.188 The resolution of potential 
conflicts between Aboriginal peoples and private ownership is a matter 
of fairness, proportionality, reasonableness, fundamental justice and 
reconciliation. It also implicates matters related to power, force, 
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coercion, manipulation and colonialism; this article is about Canada’s 
future as a just or unjust society.189 
It is my contention that Canadians and Indigenous peoples possess 
great legal imagination and creativity. We have waited too long to draw 
upon Indigenous law in helping to solve our country’s most pressing 
problems.190 We now have an opportunity to put these systems together 
with common and civil law systems in productive, synergistic ways. The 
Tsilhqot’in decision has signalled that we must move past Canada’s 
colonial derogation of Aboriginal rights. While many obstacles lie ahead, 
Canadians (and not just Indigenous peoples) are reasoning and 
reasonable people. We can construct solutions to problems we have long 
papered-over, in granting people interests in Aboriginal lands when the 
Crown did not legally or morally acquire these interests in an honourable 
fashion.  
Aboriginal title can be recognized and affirmed where “private” 
lands are involved. At the same time we can rigorously protect “private” 
ownership even if it is not construed as an absolute interest. Using the 
Tsilhqot’in decisions framework I have argued that a more nuanced legal 
approach is within our reach to reconcile Aboriginal peoples’ 
constitutional rights with other non-constitutionally protected property 
interests.  
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